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GETTING WIRELESS CARRIERS WIRED FOR LESS: AN
ARGUMENT FOR FEDERAL REGULATION OF LEC-CMRS
INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS
In 1993, Congress enacted legislation that significantly
transformed the regulatory treatment of mobile telephone ser-
vices. Section 6002 of the Omniibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 (the "Budget Act")1 amended section 332 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") 2 to preempt state
regulation of entry into the wireless market and state regula-
tion of rates charged by wireless service providers.' In addi-
tion, section 6002 of the Budget Act granted the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC or the "Commission") authority
to regulate interconnection between commercial mobile radio
service (CMRS)4 providers and other common carriers.5
1. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
2. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
3. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(b)(2)(A)(iii), § 332(c)(3)(A), 107 Stat. 312, 394
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1994)).
4. "Commercial mobile radio service" is identical to "commercial mobile service,"
which section 332(d)(1) of the 1934 Act, as amended, defines as "any mobile ser-
vice. . . that is provided for profit and makes interconnected service available . . .
to the public." 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1). Section 332(d)(2) defines "interconnected service"
as "service that is interconnected with the public switched network." Id. § 332(d)(2).
FCC regulations implementing the Budget Act define CMRS in essentially the same
manner. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.3 (1996). CMRS providers include cellular, personal com-
munications service (PCS), and most specialized mobile radio (SMR) and paging pro-
viders. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, 9
F.C.C.R. 1411, 1450, 1454-55, 1460-61 (1994) (second report and order), summarized
in 59 Fed. Reg. 18,493 (1994) [hereinafter CMRS Second Report and Order]. PCS is
a new, digital wireless service that the FCC defines broadly as "[riadio communica-
tions that encompass mobile and ancillary fixed communication that provide services
to individuals and businesses and can be integrated with a variety of competing net-
works." 47 C.F.R. § 24.5. The FCC defines SMR as "radio system in which licensees
provide land mobile communications services (other than radio location services) in
the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands on a commercial basis to entities eligible to be
licensed under this part, Federal Government entities, and individuals." 47 C.F.R. §
90.7. SMR is thus a two-way radio telephone service, similar in operation to cellular
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Less than three years later, Congress enacted the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act"),6 which significantly
amended the 1934 Act and sought to establish a "pro-competi-
tive, de-regulatory national policy framework" for the U.S. tele-
communications industry.7 One of the most far-reaching objec-
tives of the 1996 Act is the opening of local exchange markets to
competition.8 Congress sought to achieve this goal by imposing
on incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs),9 which tradition-
telephone service, though the FCC originally intended that SMR systems would not
be interconnected with the public telephone network. See Eligibility for the Spe-
cialized Mobile Radio Services and Radio Services in the 220-222 MHz Land Mobile
Band and Use of Radio Dispatch Communications, 9 F.C.C.R. 4405, 4405 (1994),
reprinted in part in 59 Fed. Reg. 42,563 (1994) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 22, 90)
(proposed Aug. 18, 1994).
5. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(b)(1)(A)(iii), § 332(c)(1)(B), 107 Stat. at 393
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(B)). Section 3 of the 1934 Act, as amended, defines
a common carrier as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate
or foreign communication by wire or radio." 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(10) (West Supp.
1997). In addition, the 1934 Act, as amended, defines CMRS providers as common
carriers. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A).
6. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified at scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
7. S. CoNF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
8. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: SPECIAL
REPORT § 1.1.9, at 22 (1996) ("The interconnection and unbundling requirements are
probably the most important and the vaguest aspects of the Act. The mandate is
sweeping- It requires unbundling and interconnection 'at any technically feasible
point within the network.') (quoting § 101(a) of the 1996 Act, 47 U.S.CA §
251(c)(3)).
9. Section 3(26) of the 1934 Act, as amended by the 1996 Act, defines a LEC as
"any person that is engaged in the provision of telephone exchange service or ex-
change access." 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(26). The FCC adopted an identical definition in its
regulations implementing the 1996 Act. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.5. Section 3(47) of the
1934 Act, as amended, defines "telephone exchange service" as "(A) service within a
telephone exchange ... or (B) comparable service provided through a system of
switches, transmission equipment, or other facilities (or combination thereof) by
which a subscriber can originate and terminate a telecommunications service." 47
U.S.C-.A § 153(47). "Telephone exchange service" is, therefore, simply telephone ser-
vice that allows a caller to place a local telephone call. Section 3(16) of the 1934
Act, as amended by the 1996 Act, defines "exchange access" as "the offering of ac-
cess to telephone exchange services or facilities for the purpose of origination or ter-
mination of telephone toll services." Id. § 153(16). The 1934 Act defines "telephone
toll service" as "telephone service between stations in different exchange areas for
which there is made a separate charge not included in contracts with subscribers for
exchange service." Id. § 153(48). Toll service encompasses non-local telephone service.
Exchange service, therefore, is the service offered by a local telephone company al-
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ally operated in a monopolistic environment, ° a number of du-
ties," including the duty to interconnect with any telecommuni-
cations carrier that requests interconnection with the LEC's
network.'2 Under the 1996 Act, incumbent LECs 5 must nego-
tiate in good faith with all requesting telecommunications carri-
ers14 to reach agreement on the terms of interconnection. 5 If
parties are not able to agree on terms of interconnection, then
the 1996 Act provides that a party may request arbitration of
unresolved terms by a state commission.1
6
The 1996 Act, therefore, presented the Commission with a
dilemma: whether the 1996 Act, which broadly governs intercon-
nection between telecommunications carriers and LECs, applies
to LEC-CMRS interconnection, thus granting jurisdiction over
lowing a caller to place a long-distance call by means of a separate long-distance
telephone provider, such as AT&T or MCI. In sum, a LEC is a company that offers
local telephone service, such as Bell Atlantic or Ameritech.
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW §
3.3.2, at 149 (1992).
11. See 47 U.S.CA § 251(c); see also infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text
(describing duties imposed on LECs).
12. See 47 U.S.C.A § 251(c)(2).
13. The term "incumbent local exchange carrier" means, "with respect to an area,
the local exchange carrier that (A) on [the date of enactment of the 1996 Act], pro-
vided telephone exchange service in such area; and (B) [complied with certain FCC
regulations]." Id. § 251(h)(1). Congress also provided that the FCC may designate
other LECs as incumbent LECs if such LECs (1) occupy a "comparable" position in
the telephone exchange market as an incumbent LEC defined in section 251(h)(1);
and (2) such treatment is "consistent with the public interest." Id. § 251(h)(2). The
FCC subsequently defined an incumbent LEC in accordance with section 251(h)(1).
See 47 C.F.R. § 51.5. Incumbent LECs are Regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs), such as Bell Atlantic or Ameritech, or independent telephone companies,
such as GTE, that historically held a monopoly license to provide telephone exchange
service within a defined geographic area. See, e.g., KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 10, §
3.3.2, at 149. The term "Local Access and Transport Area" (LATA) includes the
service area granted to an incumbent LEC. See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
569 F. Supp. 990, 994-95 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting that "the purpose of the establish-
ment of the LATAs is ... to delineate the areas in which the various telecommu-
nications companies [i.e., incumbent LECs] will operate"); see also KELLOGG ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 4.8, at 227-28 (defining LATA).
14. Although the definition of "telecommunications carrier" provided in the 1996
Act does not include specifically CMRS providers, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(44), the FCC
broadly defined the term to include CMRS providers in regulations promulgated to
interpret the 1996 Act. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.5.
15. See 47 U.S.CA § 251(c)(1).
16. See id. § 252(b)(1).
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arbitration proceedings to state commissions, or whether section
332 of the 1934 Act reserves jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS inter-
connection for the FCC. On April 19, 1996, the Commission
initiated a rulemaking, which included a request for comments
on the LEC-CMRS interconnection issue,'7 to implement the
local competition provisions of the 1996 Act.'8
On August 8, 1996, the FCC released its First Report and
Order in the interconnection proceeding.' 9 In Section X of the
Interconnection Order, the Commission concluded that sections
251 and 252 of the 1996 Act apply to LEC-CMRS interconnec-
tion.2' The Commission, however, acknowledged section 332 as
an alternative basis for jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS intercon-
nection and reserved the option of revisiting this jurisdictional
question in the future.2'
This Note discusses the alternative bases for jurisdiction over
LEC-CMRS interconnection. The Note argues that section 6002
of the Budget Act granted the FCC jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS
interconnection and that the FCC's jurisdiction remained intact
after Congress's enactment of the 1996 Act. This Note also con-
siders factors that support the assertion of federal jurisdiction in
this area. First, LECs subjected CMRS providers to discrimina-
tory treatment for many years in the area of interconnection.
This treatment existed despite regulatory oversight by state
public utility commissions. Moreover, several states promulgated
regulations that discriminated against CMRS providers. Second,
although CMRS providers have negotiated substantially more
favorable interconnection agreements since the 1996 Act, some
17. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 14,171 (1996), reprinted in 61 Fed. Reg. 18,311
(1996) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 51) (proposed Apr. 25, 1996) [hereinafter
Interconnection NPRM].
18. See id. at 14,228-29.
19. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) (first report and order), reprinted in
part in 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476 (1996) [hereinafter Interconnection Order]. The Eighth
Circuit recently vacated aspects of the Interconnection Order but held that the provi-
sions in which the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction were severable. See Iowa Utils. Bd.
v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321 et al., 1997 WL 403401 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997); infra notes
202-10 and accompanying text.
20. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,005.
21. See id.
[Vol. 39:229232
1997] WIRELESS INTERCONNECTION 233
LECs continue to subject CMRS providers to discriminatory
treatment. Finally, recognizing FCC jurisdiction to regulate
LEC-CMRS interconnection will further Congress's stated policy
goals of promoting interconnection between LECs and CMRS
providers, fostering the development of a national wireless infra-
structure, and furthering the goal of a procompetitive telecom-
munications regulatory framework.
In light of the past and current experiences of CMRS provid-
ers at the state level, this Note argues that the FCC should
assert its jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection and regu-
late LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements. This Note also
proposes one solution: federal arbitration of LEC-CMRS inter-
connection agreements.
THE IMPORTANCE OF LEC-CMRS INTRCONNECTION
By definition, all CMRS providers interconnect with the public
switched network.2 CMRS providers must interconnect' with
the public switched network so that a wireless customer can
place a call to a landline, i.e., nonwireless customer, or vice
versa.' Because there are many more wireline phones than
22. The FCC defines CMRS as a mobile service that is "(1) provided for prof-
it . . . ; (2) An interconnected service; and (3) Available to the public." 47 C.F.R. §
20.3 (1996). "Interconnected service" is a service that is "interconnected with the
public switched network .. . that gives subscribers the capability to communicate to
or to receive communication from all other users on the public switched network."
Id.
23. The FCC regulations define "interconnection" as "the linking of two networks
for the mutual exchange of traffic." 47 C.F.R. § 51.5. The Eighth Circuit recently up-
held this interpretation of "interconnection." See Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n v.
FCC, 117 F.3d 1068, 1071-73 (8th Cir. 1997). Interconnection in the LEC-CMRS con-
text thus simply involves a physical connection between a LEC's network and a
CMRS provider's network so that calls can be exchanged between the two networks.
See id. at 1073.
24. The term "landline" refers to the "provision of telephone service by wire or
'vireline' service." Mobiletel, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 19,098, 19,106 (1996). The FCC thus
uses the terms "landline" and "wireline" interchangeably. See i. "The term 'wireline'
describes a system in which the connections between individual customers and cen-
tral offices are made by wires, as opposed to alternative technologies such as radio
links." Mobiletel, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.3d 888, 892 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This Note us-
es the term "landline" interchangeably with the term "wireline."
25. See PETER W. HUBER, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, THE GEODESIC NETWoRIx 1987
REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 4.9-.10 (1987). When a cellu-
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mobile phones," a substantial majority of calls made by wire-
less subscribers are routed through the public switched network
via a LEC. The LEC interconnecting a CMRS provider to the
public switched network thus controls a "bottleneck" in the com-
pletion of most telephone calls to or from mobile phone users.'
The FCC has recognized that LEC-CMRS interconnection is
essential to the provision of wireless telecommunications since
the early stages of its regulation of cellular telecommunica-
tions.29 In a 1994 rulemaking order implementing the Budget
lar subscriber places a call, the handset transmits the call to the nearest base sta-
tion antenna, which locates the center of the cell from which the subscriber placed
the call. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995),
vacated as moot, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996); HUBER, supra, at 4.2 n.6. The an-
tenna transmits the call either by telephone wires or by microwave to the Mobile
Telephone Switching Office (MTSO), which is the central switch for the cellular
provider serving that customer. See HUBER, supra, at 4.2 n.6. If the call is to anoth-
er cellular customer of that provider, then the cellular provider routes the call di-
rectly via its own switch; if the call is to a wireline number, then the MTSO deliv-
ers the call to the LEC switch, which then routes the call over the public switched
network. See id.
26. See Applications of Craig 0. McCaw, Transferor, and American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, Transferee, for Consent to the Transfer of Control of McCaw
Cellular Communications, Inc. and its Subsidiaries, 9 F.C.C.R. 5836, 5855 (1994)
(memorandum opinion and order) (noting AT&T claims that 99% of cellular calls are
to landline phones); William Newman, Reality Check on Bill & Keep, CELLULAR BUS.,
Feb. 1997, at 78, 80 (stating that approximately 98% of outgoing cellular calls termi-
nate on the wireline network).
27. See HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.9-.10.
28. Similarly, if the CMRS subscriber's call is a long-distance call, then the LEC
generally routes the call to the subscriber's chosen long-distance provider. See West-
ern Elec., 890 F. Supp. at 3-5. This interconnection arrangement also creates a
'mobile bottleneck" because the LEC controls an essential step in the routing of
most long-distance cellular calls. See id. at 4 ("[The Mobile Bottleneck gives the lo-
cal companies (usually the Regional [Bell Operating] Companies) the ability to con-
trol a part of virtually every interexchange cellular call . . . ."); see also SBC Com-
munications, Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing the ex-
istence of a "mobile bottleneck" for cellular long-distance calls).
29. See An Inquiry into the Use of Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Communications Systems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the
Commission's Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, 89 F.C.C.2d 58,
81 (1982) (memorandum opinion and order on reconsideration), reprinted in 47 Fed.
Reg. 10,018 (1982) [hereinafter Cellular Reconsideration Order]; An Inquiry Relative
to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz; and Amendment of Parts 2,
18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91, and 93 of the Rules Relative to Operations in the Land Mo-
bile Service Between 806-960 MHz, 51 F.C.C.2d 945, 954-55 (1975) (memorandum
opinion and order), [hereinafter 1975 Cellular Order], modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 571
234
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Act, the FCC emphasized that "commercial mobile radio service
interconnection with the public switched network will be an
essential component in the successful establishment and growth
of CMRS offerings." 0
Interconnection Charges
LECs impose charges on CMRS providers for interconnection
with the public switched network. LECs apply these charges
primarily on a "minute of use" basis for LEC transport and ter-
mination of calls originated by wireless customers, although
many LECs also impose flat rate fees for use of their wireline
facilities.3 ' "Transport" involves the transmission of telecommu-
nications traffic from the point of physical interconnection be-
tween the two carriers to the LEC switch that serves the called
party.32 "Termination" encompasses the remaining portion of
(1982), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 32,537 (1982). The FCC also emphasized a cellular
provider's entitlement to "reasonable interconnection" that is compatible with the de-
sign of the cellular system. See Common Carrier Services; FCC Policy Statement on
Interconnection of Cellular Systems, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,838, 10,838 (1986) [hereinafter
Policy Statement]; Cellular Reconsideration Order, supra, at 81.
30. CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1499. The Commission also
noted:
From the perspective of customers, the ubiquity of such interconnection
arrangements will help facilitate the universal deployment of diverse
commercial mobile radio services. From a competitive perspective, the
LECs' provision of interconnection to CMRS licensees at reasonable rates,
and on reasonable terms and conditions, will ensure that LEC commer-
cial mobile radio service affiliates do not receive any unfair competitive
advantage over other providers in the CMRS marketplace.
Id. This last sentence refers to the FCC's decision to award two cellular licensees in
each market area: one to the wireless affiliate of the incumbent LEC serving that
market and the other to an independent cellular operator. See An Inquiry Into the
Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Sys-
tems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of FCC Cellular Communications Systems
Rules, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 476, 483 (1981) (report and order), reprinted in 46 Fed. Reg.
27,655 (1981) [hereinafter Cellular Report], modified, Cellular Reconsideration Order,
supra note 29; HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.5-.6.
31. See Harry E. Young, The Contentious Issue of Interconnection Rates, CELLULAR
BUS., Sept. 1996, at 60, 64.
32. The FCC defines "transport" as "the transmission and any necessary tandem
switching of local telecommunications traffic... from the interconnection point be-
tween the two carriers to the terminating carrier's end office switch that directly
serves the called party." 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(c) (1996).
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the call: switching of the traffic on the LEC switch and de-
livery of the call to the called party's telephone."3 By collect-
ing transport and termination costs, therefore, an LEC recov-
ers the costs of completing a call originated by another carri-
er.
The rates charged by LECs for transport and termination
of traffic handed over by CMRS providers are a significant
factor in determining the growth of the wireless industry
because interconnection charges constitute a significant part
of wireless carriers' operating expenses." In 1996, MTA-
EMCI, a. Washington telecommunications consulting firm, esti-
mated that wireless carriers paid $1.3 billion annually in
interconnection fees. 5 Prior to the 1996 Act, LECs, as monop-
oly providers of wireline telephone exchange service in most
areas, frequently used their greater bargaining power to im-
pose higher transport and termination rates on CMRS provid-
ers than those offered to wireline carriers.36 If LECs can
obtain such discriminatory interconnection rates in intercon-
nection agreements negotiated or arbitrated pursuant to the
1996 Act, then they can continue to hinder the development
of the wireless industry."
33. The FCC defines "termination" as "the switching of local telecommunications
traffic at the terminating carrier's end office switch, or equivalent facility, and deliv-
ery of such traffic to the called party's premises." Id. § 51.701(d).
34. See Young, supra note 31, at 65 (noting that interconnection fees constitute
approximately 13% of operating expenses for a cellular carrier in a top 30 market);
HUBER, aupra note 25, at 4.16 (stating that "[ilnterconnection costs are typically 10
to 20 percent of mobile carrier's operating expenses").
35. See Young, supra note 31, at 65. MTA-EMCI estimated that annual intercon-
nection fee payments by CMRS providers to LECs will decline to $1.1 billion by
2005 due to reforms introduced by the 1996 Act. See id.
36. See infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
37. See Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Providers, 11 F.C.C.R. 5020, 5087 (1996), reprinted in part in 61 Fed.
Reg. 3644 (1996) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 20, 51) (proposed Feb. 1, 1996) [here-
inafter LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM] (separate statement of Comm'r Susan
Ness) ("'Today, there is a very real danger that wireline local exchange carriers
('LECs') will . . . charge too much for interconnection services.").
236 [Vol. 39:229
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Mutual Compensation
The principle of mutual or reciprocal compensation s is also
important to the continued development of the wireless industry.
Mutual compensation entails the payment of transport and ter-
mination charges by each interconnecting carrier for traffic origi-
nating on its network and handed over to the other carrier.39 In
essence, under mutual compensation, "compensation flows in
both directions between interconnecting networks.4
LECs traditionally have entered into interconnection agree-
ments with other LECs that provide for mutual compensation
for traffic exchanged between the carriers.4' Prior to the 1996
38. The terms "mutual compensation" and "reciprocal compensation" are synony-
mons. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,045 n.2634.
39. The FCC defines a reciprocal compensation arrangement as "one in which each
of the two carriers receives compensation from the other carrier for the transport
and termination on each carrier's network facilities of local telecommunications traf-
fic that originates on the network facilities of the other carrier." 47 C.F.R. §
51.701(e) (1996).
40. Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,045 n.2634.
41. See The Need to Promote Competition and Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio
Common Carrier Services, 4 F.C.C.R. 2369, 2373 (1989) (memorandum opinion and
order on reconsideration) [hereinafter RCC Reconsideration Order]; The Need to Pro-
mote Competition and Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio Common Carrier Services,
2 F.C.C.R. 2910, 2915 (1987) (declaratory ruling) [hereinafter RCC Interconnection
Ruling]; MFS Intelenet of ill., Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 94-0422, 1995 WL
113970, at *6 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n Feb. 8, 1995) (noting that Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Company, the principal incumbent LEC in Illinois, provides mutual compensa-
tion to other LECs); see also Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 15,927 (noting
CTIA comments on LEC-LEC interconnection agreements in 18 states).
Traditionally, LECs have entered into contracts to establish mutual compensa-
tion rates for LEC-LEC interconnection. See Competition for Local Exchange Service,
Decision 95-12-056, 1995 WL 767891, at *34 (Cal. P.U.C. Dec. 20, 1995) (citing com-
ments filed by GTE California, Inc.). In the past 10 years, however, LECs have
entered into "bill-and-keep" arrangements under which each LEC terminates traffic
delivered to it by the other LEC without any monetary compensation between the
LECs. See RCC Reconsideration Order, supra, at 2372 (noting that "BellSouth has
been developing new compensation agreements with ITCs [independent telephone
companies, i.e., non-RBOC LECs] whereby each carrier recovers the costs of the
facilities it provides, and mutual compensation is eliminated"). Today, LECs common-
ly incorporate bill-and-keep into interconnection agreements with other LECs. See
Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,049 (citing comments arguing that bill-
and-keep is a common practice between incumbent LECs); Electric Lightwave, Inc.,
167 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 30, 73 (Or. P.U.C. 1996) (noting that bill-and-keep is
the "dominant practice" in agreements between "adjacent LEC exchanges in Oregon
and throughout the nation").
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Act, however, LECs rarely entered into mutual compensation
interconnection agreements with CMRS providers.42 As a re-
sult, CMRS providers traditionally paid LECs transport and
termination charges for traffic originated on the wireless net-
work, but could not recover the costs they incurred in termi-
nating calls that originated on the wireline network. By refus-
ing to enter reciprocal compensation interconnection agree-
ments with CMRS providers, LECs discriminated against
CMRS providers, deprived CMRS providers of a significant
stream of revenues,43 and thus hindered the ability of wireless
providers to offer telephone service competitive with wireline
telephone service.
THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING
LEC-CMRS INTERCONNECTION
The propriety of the Commission's determination in the
Interconnection Order that sections 251 and 252 govern LEC-
CMRS interconnection must be examined in the context of the
statutory and regulatory framework that existed prior to enact-
ment of the 1996 Act. This Note now discusses the
Commission's jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection be-
fore and after the Budget Act of 1993.
42. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,010 (summarizing commenters'
contentions that mutual compensation should apply to arrangements between CMRS
providers and LECs); HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.18 (noting that only a "few [Bell
Operating Companies] have entered into agreements that provide for reciprocal com-
pensation"); Paul G. Madison, Commercial Mobile Radio Carriers Are Entitled to
Compensation for Call Termination, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 79, 80 (1996) (noting
that "other than possibly some cellular carriers, CMRS carriers are not being com-
pensated by the LECs for call termination").
43. Under LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements in effect in 1996 prior to rene-
gotiation under the Act, wireless carriers paid annual interconnection fees of about
$1.3 billion. See Young, supra note 31, at 65. Assuming industry estimates that ap-
proximately 20% of wireless traffic is land-to-mobile (i.e. terminates on wireless
networks), see id., and assuming that under mutual compensation, LECs and CMRS
providers would charge symmetrical rates by refusing to provide mutual compensa-
tion to wireless carriers, LECs deprived CMRS providers of approximately $325 mil-
lion in annual revenues (LECs received revenues of $1.3 billion from transport and
termination fees for terminating 80% of LEC-CMRS traffic; therefore, CMRS provid-
ers should receive one quarter of this amount, or $325 million, for terminating 20%
of LEC-CMRS traffic).
[Vol. 39:229238
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The Statutory and Regulatory Framework Prior to the Budget
Act
The Communications Act of 1934: The Interstate/Intrastate
Dichotomy
The 1934 Act creates a dual regulatory structure for interstate
and intrastate telecommunications." Section 1 of the 1934 Act
authorizes the creation of the FCC for the purpose of "regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio." 5 Title II of the 1934 Act authorizes the FCC to regulate
common carriers4 ' engaged in interstate communications.4 7
Section 201(a) imposes a duty on every common carrier to in-
terconnect with other carriers if the Commission finds such
interconnection is in the public interest." In addition, section
201(b) requires that common carriers charge "just and reason-
able" rates for services provided pursuant to section 201(a).49
Section 2(b) of the 1934 Act, however, specifically withholds
jurisdiction from the Commission with regard to intrastate ser-
vices, subject to a number of exceptions." Section 301 of the
1934 Act5' is the most significant of these exceptions, granting
the FCC plenary authority to manage the radio spectrum and
issue radio licenses.5 Section 301 serves as the basis of the
44. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 (1986) ("The
Communications Act... establishes dual state and federal regulation of telephone
service .... ); RCC Interconnection Ruling, supra note 41, at 2911.
45. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
46. See supra note 5.
47. See 47 U.S.CA- §§ 201-76 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
48. Section 201(a) states: "It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio . . , in cases where the
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary or desirable
in the public interest, to establish physical connections with other carriers .... " 47
U.S.C. § 201(a).
49. Id. § 201(b).
50. That section provides:
Except as provided in [enumerated sections of Title 47 of the U.S. Code],
nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to apply or to give the Commis-
sion jurisdiction with respect to ... charges, classifications, practices,
services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communication service by wire or radio ....
Id. § 152(b).
51. Id. § 301.
52. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1963)
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FCC's authority to regulate the issuance of cellular and other
mobile service licenses.53 Notwithstanding these exceptions to
section 2(b), Congress has limited the FCC's jurisdiction to regu-
lation of interstate or foreign communications.' The FCC, there-
fore, traditionally has limited its regulation of LEC-CMRS inter-
connection rates to interconnection related to interstate com-
munications.55
FCC Regulation of LEC-Cellular Interconnection Prior to the
Budget Act
From the earliest stages of its regulation of cellular telephony,
the FCC recognized that cellular systems "must be fully inter-
connected with the public landline telephone network."" In
1981, prior to awarding the first cellular radio construction per-
mits in 1982,"7 the Commission made its first attempt at devel-
(stating that "federal control is clearly exclusive" over frequency allocation pursuant
to section 301); see also National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214
(1943) (stating that the 1934 Act, like its predecessor, the Radio Act of 1927, "for-
mulated a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the industry") (quoting
FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940)).
53. See Cellular Report, supra note 30, at 503-05; KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 13.2, at 645.
54. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986) ("By its
terms, this provision fences off from FCC reach or regulation intrastate mat-
ters . . . ."); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321 et al., 1997 WL 403401, at *5-
*6 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
55. See CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1497-98. An "interstate
communication" is any communication that originates in one state and terminates in
another. See 47 U.S.CJ.A § 153(22) (West Supp. 1997).
56. 1975 Cellular Order, supra note 29, at 954-55.
57. See John W. Berresford, The Impact of Law and Regulation on Technology:
The Case History of Cellular Radio, 44 BUS. LAW. 721, 727 (1989). In 1977, the FCC
granted a construction permit to Illinois Bell Telephone Company for a developmen-
tal cellular system in Chicago. See Application of ill. Bell Tel. Co., 63 F.C.C.2d 655
(1977), affd sub nom. Rogers Radio Communication Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d
1225 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Philip Palmer McGuigan et al., Cellular Mobile Radio Tele-
communications: Regulating an Emerging Industry, 1983 BYU L. REV. 305, 314. The
FCC authorized Illinois Bell to offer cellular service to the Chicago area in 1979. See
Telocater Network v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 70 F.C.C.2d 713, 716-17 (1979). The FCC
issued the first nondevelopmental cellular telephone construction permits in 1982,
and cellular service began in several major cities the following year. See Berresford,
supra, at 727. By 1984, the FCC had issued 32 cellular licenses. See KELLOGG ET
AL., supra note 10, § 13.1, at 644.
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oping a LEC-cellular interconnection policy.5" The Cellular Re-
port recognized that LECs should permit cellular systems to
interconnect to the wireline network in the same manner as a
LEC end-office switch 9 because cellular system operators are
common carriers rather than LEC customers. 0 The FCC noted
that the parties should negotiate the particular terms and condi-
tions of interconnection.6 With respect to interconnection rates,
the FCC declared that LECs should provide interconnection
"upon terms no less favorable than those offered to the cellular
systems of affiliated entities or independent telephone compa-
nies." 2 On reconsideration, the FCC affirmed that LECs have a
duty "to provide reasonable interconnection to cellular sys-
tems,"" including interconnection in an identical manner as
that provided to wireline cellular systems."
The FCC clarified its reasonable interconnection policy in
1986, stating that a "cellular carrier should be permitted to
choose the type of interconnection, Type 2 or Type 1, and [LECs]
should not refuse to provide the type of interconnection request-
ed."' The FCC also introduced a good faith negotiation stan-
58. See Cellular Report, supra note 30, at 495-96.
59. An "end-office switch7 is a switch that directly connects customer telephone
lines into the wireline network and thus routes telephone traffic at the first and last
stages of most telephone calls. See, e.g., Union Tel. Co. v. Wyoming Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 833 P.2d 473, 475, 483 (Wyo. 1992) (describing the role of an end-office
switch in a LE's traditional arrangement with cellular carriers and illustrating a
typical end-office interconnection agreement).
60. See Cellular Report, supra note 30, at 496.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Cellular Reconsideration Order, supra note 29, at 81.
64. See id. at 81-82. The FCC licensed two cellular systems in each market. See
supra note 30. A wireline cellular system is the system operated by an affiliate of
the incumbent LEC in a given market. See supra note 30.
65. Policy Statement, supra note 29, at 10,838. The FCC provided the following
definition of Type 1 and Type 2 interconnection:
Under Type 1 interconnection, the telephone company owns the switch
serving the cellular network and, therefore, performs the origination and
termination of both incoming and outgoing calls. Under Type 2, the cellular
carrier owns the switch, enabling it to originate outgoing calls and to ter-
minate incoming calls. There are two forms of Type 2 interconnection, Type
2A and Type 2B. Type 2A service is interconnection to a local telephone
company tandem [switch] similar to that used by an end office. Type 2B
involves interconnection at an end office to a high usage interoffice trunk.
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dard, noting "we must leave the terms and conditions to be ne-
gotiated in good faith between the cellular operator and the
telephone company."66 The FCC declined to establish any policy
with respect to interconnection rates, noting that "in view of the
fact that cellular carriers are engaged in the provision of local,
intrastate, exchange telephone service, the compensation ar-
rangements among cellular carriers and local telephone compa-
nies are largely a matter of state, not federal concern."67
In May of 1986, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Loui-
siana Public Service Commission v. FCC," which emphasized
the limits of the Commission's jurisdiction over intrastate mat-
ters. The Court held that the dual regulatory system established
by Congress in sections 1 and 2(b) of the 1934 Act generally
prohibited the FCC from regulating intrastate communica-
tions.69 The Court stated that section 2(b) "fences off from FCC
reach or regulation intrastate matters."7" The Court noted,
however, one exception: the FCC may preempt state regulation
of intrastate communications where it is "not possible to sepa-
RCC Reconsideration Order, supra note 41, at 2377 n.16. Huber explained:
Type 1 interconnection treats the MTSO as a PBX [private branch ex-
change, i.e. multi-line phone system commonly used by business organi-
zations] served primarily by a single end office. Type 1 interconnection
offers inferior transmission quality .. and makes inefficient use of
MTSO switching facilities. Type 2A interconnection treats the MTSO as a
tandem switch, with links to a number of end-offices and other carriers.
This provides cellular carriers with lower interconnection costs ... and
improved transmission.
HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.12-.13. Because Type 2A interconnection offers superior
service quality and lower rates, wireless carriers generally prefer this type of inter-
connection. See RCC Interconnection Ruling, supra note 41, at 2913.
A tandem switch is an intermediate switch that interconnects end-office switches
with the toll network, which carries long-distance calls. See In re The Application of
Iowa Network Access Div. for Auth. Pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications
Act of 1934 and Section 63.01 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Lease
Transmission Facilities to Provide Access Service to Interexchange Carriers in the
State of Iowa, 3 F.C.C.R. 1468, 1474 n.5 (1988) (memorandum opinion, order and
certificate); see also Union Tel. Co. v. Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 833 P.2d 473,
484 (Wyo. 1992) (illustrating the relationship of tandem and end-office switches).
66. Policy Statement, supra note 29, at 10,839.
67. Id.
68. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
69. See id. at 370.
70. Id.
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rate the interstate and intrastate components of the asserted
FCC regulation."7'
Following Louisiana Public Service Commission, the FCC
released a declaratory ruling that more precisely determined the
Commission's jurisdiction with respect to LEC-cellular intercon-
nection.72 The Commission determined that it had plenary ju-
risdiction over three aspects of LEC-cellular interconnection: (1)
the physical plant used in interconnection of cellular carriers;73
(2) the allocation of NXX codes 4 to cellular carriers;75 and (3)
the conduct of negotiations between the two parties.7" On this
last point, the FCC mandated that LECs conduct interconnec-
tion negotiations in good faith.77
On the important issue of interconnection rates, the FCC
determined that "the actual costs and charges for the physical
71. Id. at 375 n.4. Courts subsequently have termed this exception the "impossi-
bility" or "inseverability" exception. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321 et al.,
1997 WIL 403401, at *6 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997); Jonathan Jacob Nadler, Give Peace
a Chance: FCC-State Relations After California III, 47 FED. COM. L.J. 457, 501
(1995).
Subsequent to Louisiana Public Service Commission, the FCC has authority to
regulate intrastate communications in only two circumstances: (1) where Congress
has overridden the dual regulatory system by "unambiguously granting the FCC
authority over intrastate telecommunications matters or by directly modifying section
2(b)," or (2) where the "impossibility" exception applies. Iowa Utils. Bd., 1997 WL
403401, at *6.
72. See RCC Interconnection Ruling, supra note 41.
73. See id. at 2912.
74. "An NXX code is the first three numbers in a typical seven digit telephone
number. Each NXX code includes a block of 10,000 telephone numbers. The function
of the code is to instruct switches to communicate with other switches in the pro-
cessing of a call. Id. at 2918 n.32. CMRS providers must obtain NXX codes to pro-
vide subscribers with telephone numbers for their mobile telephones. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 2912-13.
77. See id. at 2913. The Commission justified preemption of state regulation in
this area by stating.
[W]e find that the conduct of interconnection negotiations cannot be sepa-
rated into interstate and intrastate components. Good faith cannot be
quantified and allocated according to relative interstate and intrastate
use. Furthermore, any state regulation which permits departures from
our good faith requirement could severely affect interstate communica-
tions by preventing cellular carriers from obtaining interconnection agree-
ments and consequently excluding them from the nationwide public tele-
phone network.
Id. at 2912-13.
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interconnections of cellular systems are suited to dual intrastate
and interstate regulation" because "it is possible to divide the
actual interstate and intrastate costs of cellular interconnec-
tion."7" The FCC thus emphasized that its "jurisdiction is limit-
ed to the actual interstate cost of interconnection."79 Exercising
this jurisdiction, the Commission stated that LECs should ob-
serve the principle of mutual compensation and that interstate
rates for switching8" and physical interconnection should be
cost-based.8' Finally, the Commission expanded this reasonable
interconnection standard to include interconnection between
LECs and all radio common carriers (RCCs),8' not just cellular
carriers.8"
On reconsideration of the RCC Interconnection Ruling in
1989, the FCC reaffirmed this reasonable interconnection stan-
dard and clarified that the mutual compensation requirement
applied only to interstate interconnection."
Prior to the Budget Act, therefore, the FCC asserted jurisdic-
tion over interstate LEC-RCC interconnection rates and ordered
mutual compensation with respect to such interconnection. The
FCC apparently recognized that it lacked jurisdiction to regulate
intrastate interconnection rates or to impose mutual compensa-
tion on intrastate LEC-RCC interconnection.
78. Id. at 2912.
79. Id.
80. Switching is one of the components of transport and termination. See supra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
81. See RCC Interconnection Ruling, supra note 41, at 2915.
82. The FCC defines a "radio common carrier" as a "telecommunications carrier
that provides radio communications services but is not engaged in the business of
providing landline local exchange telephone service." 47 C.F.R. § 22.99 (1996).
83. See RCC Interconnection Ruling, supra note 41, at 2913.
84. See RCC Reconsideration Order, supra note 41. In the RCC Interconnection
Ruling, the Commission failed to state expressly that the mutual compensation re-
quirement applied only to interstate interconnection. See RCC Interconnection Ruling,
supra note 41, at 2915. On reconsideration, the FCC noted that "[iun the instant
proceeding, we are only concerned with mutual compensation between telephone com-
panies and cellular carriers for interstate switching costs." RCC Reconsideration Or-
der, supra note 41, at 2372.
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The Budget Act of 19935
Section 6002 of the Budget Act amended section 332(c) of the
1934 Act and substantially reconfigured the regulatory treat-
ment of wireless services. By enacting section 6002, Congress
intended to achieve regulatory parity in the field of wireless
services.86 The Budget Act amended section 332(c) to classify all
wireless services that operate for profit and provide intercon-
nected service as CMRS providers." Two provisions of section
332(c), as amended by the Budget Act, arguably expand the
FCC's jurisdiction in the context of LEC-CMRS interconnection
and warrant further discussion.
Section 332(c)(1)(B)"
Section 332(c)(1)(B), as amended, provides that:
Upon reasonable request of any person providing commercial
mobile service, the Commission shall order a common carrier
to establish physical connections with such service pursuant
to the provisions of section 201 of this title. Except to the
extent that the Commission is required to respond to such a
request, this subparagraph shall not be construed as a limita-
tion or expansion of the Commission's authority to order
interconnection pursuant to this [Act]."
85. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 259 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CA.N. 378,
586 ("This section amends section 332(c) to provide that services that provide
equivalent mobile services are regulated in the same manner.").
87. As amended by the Budget Act, section 332(c)(1)(A) now provides that "[a]
person engaged in the provision of a service that is a commercial mobile service
shall, insofar as such person is so engaged, be treated as a common carrier for pur-
poses of this [Act]." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A) (1994). Section 332(d)(1) defines "com-
mercial mobile service" as "any mobile service ... that is provided for profit and
makes interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such classes of eli-
gible users as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of the public." Id. §
332(d)(1). In the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Budget Act, the
Conference Committee stated that "[t]he intent of [section 332(c)(1)(A)], as modified,
is to establish a Federal regulatory framework to govern the offering of all commer-
cial mobile services." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 490 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.N. 1088, 1179.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(B).
89. Id. Section 201 requires common carriers engaged in interstate communications
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Section 332(c)(1)(B) states that the Commission has authority
to regulate LEC-CMRS interconnection pursuant to section
201.' ° Although section 332(c)(1)(B) represents an expansion of
the Commission's authority with respect to LEC-CMRS intercon-
nection, the extent of this expansion is not entirely clear.
Three interpretations of section 332(c)(1)(B) are plausible.
First, the section simply may authorize the FCC to order inter-
state LEC-CMRS interconnection upon any reasonable request
by a CMRS provider but not grant the FCC authority to regulate
LEC-CMRS interconnection rates.9' The FCC, however, already
has this authority under section 201; such an interpretation
thus renders section 332(c)(1)(B) superfluous and should be
disfavored. 2
Second, the section can be interpreted to authorize the FCC to
require interstate LEC-CMRS interconnection without the neces-
sity of providing an opportunity for a hearing and a finding that
interconnection is "necessary or desirable in the public inter-
est."93 Section 201(a), however, imposes this "finding" re-
quirement," and section 332(c)(1)(B) states expressly that inter-
to interconnect physically with other carriers as directed by the Commission. See 47
U.S.C. § 201(a).
90. Section 201(b) requires that charges for interstate communication service pro-
vided under section 201(a) be "just and reasonable." 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
91. Several LECs, including Ameritech and BellSouth, presented this argument in
the LEC-CMRS Interconnection proceeding. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19,
at 16,004; see also Letter from Michael K. Kellogg, Counsel for Bell Atlantic Corp.
and Pacific Telesis Group, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC 5 (Feb. 26,
1996) (on file with the FCC in CC Docket No. 95-185 (LEC-CMRS Interconnection
proceeding)) [hereinafter Kellogg Feb. 26 Letter] (commenting that "[slection
332(c)(1)(B) simply states that physical interconnection arrangements must be estab-
lished 'pursuant to the provisions of section 201 of this Act!").
92. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (stating
that "courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superflu-
ous"); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (noting the "set-
tled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every
word has some operative effect").
93. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a). The comments submitted in the Interconnection rulemaking
proceeding apparently did not raise this interpretation. See Interconnection Order,
supra note 19, at 16,001-04 (reviewing comments on the relationship between sec-
tions 251 and 332(c)).
94. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a).
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connection shall be made "pursuant to the provisions of section
201."95 This interpretation thus is mired in a contradiction.96
Third, section 332(c)(1)(B) can be interpreted to extend FCC
jurisdiction to the regulation of intrastate LEC-CMRS intercon-
nection.97 This interpretation is consistent with the second sen-
tence of section 332(c)(1)(B): "Except to the extent that the Com-
mission is required to respond to such a request, this subpara-
graph shall not be construed as a limitation or expansion of the
Commission's authority to order interconnection pursuant to this
[Act]. " " This sentence implies that section 332(c)(1)(B) expands
the Commission's jurisdiction in the limited realm of LEC-CMRS
interconnection, but does not modify the Commission's jurisdic-
tion with respect to other types of interconnection. 9
The Budget Act's legislative history supports this interpreta-
tion. With regard to section 332(c)(1)(B), the House Budget Com-
mittee Report stated: "The Committee considers the right to
interconnect an important one which the Commission shall seek
to promote, since interconnection serves to enhance competition
and advance a seamless national network."'0 0 This language
suggests that Congress granted the FCC broad authority to "pro-
mote" LEC-CMRS interconnection.
Under this interpretation of section 332(c)(1)(B), the FCC has
authority to require just and reasonable intrastate LEC-CMRS
95. Id. § 332(c)(1)(B).
96. Furthermore, an axiom of statutory construction is that, "where possible, pro-
visions of a statute should be read so as not to create a conflict." Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986).
97. Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) and several CMES
providers, including Cox Enterprises, Inc. (Cox), Comcast Corp. (Comcast), and
AirTouch Communications, Inc. (AirTouch) advocated this position in the LEC-CMRS
Interconnection proceeding. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,002-03;
see also Memorandum from Thomas Krattenmaker on behalf of AirTouch to William
F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC 4-7 (Mar. 20, 1996) (on file with the FCC in CC
Docket No. 95-185) [hereinafter Krattenmaker Memorandum] (arguing that the Bud-
get Act revisions of the Communications Act eliminated the "interstate/mtrastate ju-
risdictional dichotomy" with respect to CMRS).
98. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(B).
99. See Krattenmaker Memorandum, supra note 97, at 5; Letter from Werner K.
Hartenberger & Laura H. Phillips, Counsel for Cox Enterprises, Inc., to William F.
Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC 3 (Feb. 28, 1996) (on file with the FCC in CC Docket
No. 95-185).
100. HR. REP. No. 103-111, at 261 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
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interconnection rates because the provision directs the FCC to
order LEC-CMRS interconnection "pursuant to section 201, "1o1
which in turn authorizes the FCC to ensure that interconnection
rates are "just and reasonable.""0 2 The text and legislative his-
tory of section 332(c)(1)(B) thus support the view that Congress
intended the Commission to have jurisdiction to regulate LEC-
CMRS interconnection rates, without regard to the interstate or
intrastate character of the interconnection.
Section 332(c)(3)(A)103
Section 332(c)(3)(A), subtitled "state preemption," preempts
explicitly state and local governments from regulating CMRS
rates and from entering into the CMRS market. This section
states, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding sections 152(b) and 221(b) of this title, no
State or local government shall have any authority to regu-
late the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mo-
bile service or any private mobile service, except that this
provision shall not prohibit a State from regulating the other
terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.'
A literal reading of the term "charged by" suggests that it
preempts state regulation of intrastate interconnection rates
charged by CMRS providers to other carriers, including rates
charged by CMRS providers to LECs for transport and termina-
tion of LEC-originated traffic.0 5 The FCC indicated that it sup-
ported this interpretation of the provision' and repeated its
101. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(B).
102. Id. § 201(b); see Krattenmaker Memorandum, supra note 97, at 4-5.
103. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,002-03 (citing comments sub-
mitted by CTIA); Letter from Phillip L. Verveer & Jennifer A. Donaldson, Wilkie,
Farr & Gallagher, to Karen Brinkmann, Special Counsel for Local Competition, Com-
mon Carrier Bureau, FCC 2, 7 (Oct. 27, 1995) (on file with the FCC in CC Docket
No. 94-54) [hereinafter Verveer Letter].
106. See CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1499 (stating that the
Budget Act "preempts state regulation of interconnection rates of CMRS providers").
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position in a notice of proposed rulemaking it issued later that
year.117 The FCC's interpretation is consistent with the legisla-
tive history of section 332(c)(3). The House Budget Committee
Report stated the purpose of this provision is "[tlo foster the
growth and development of mobile services that, by their nature,
operate without regard to state lines as an integral part of the
national telecommunications infrastructure."" 8 A broad inter-
pretation of the preemptive reach of section 332(c)(3) would
prevent any attempt by states to prohibit CO RS providers from
charging LECs for the cost of transporting and terminating
wireline-originated calls and thus would foster the growth of the
wireless industry.
The FCC subsequently acknowledged, however, that section
332(c)(3) does not preempt state regulation of intrastate inter-
connection rates charged by LECs.10 Section 332(c)(3) thus
does not provide authority for FCC jurisdiction of all aspects of
LEC-CMRS interconnection, even under the FCC's interpreta-
tion of this provision.
An alternative interpretation, and one more faithful to the
text of the entire section and its legislative history, is that Con-
gress enacted section 332(c)(3)(A) to preempt state regulation of
wireless service rates charged by CMRS providers to their retail
customers."' First, a sentence within the section provides that
107. See Equal Access and Interconnection Obligations Pertaining to Commercial
Mobile Radio Services, 9 F.C.C.R. 5408, 5468-69 (1994), summarized in 59 Fed. Reg.
35,664 (1994) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 20, 22) (proposed July 13, 1994)
("With respect to state jurisdiction over the intrastate interconnection rates charged
by CMRS providers, the CMRS Second Report determined that the Budget Act pre-
empts any state regulation of CMRS interconnection rates.") (first emphasis added).
108. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 260 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587.
109. See Petition on Behalf of the La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. for Authority to Retain
Existing Jurisdiction over Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. Offered Within the State
of La., 10 F.C.C.R. 7898, 7908 (1995) (report and order).
110. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,004-05 & n.2423 (citing
comments filed by Pacific Telesis, US West, BellSouth, and the Pennsylvania P.U.C.);
Letter from Michael K. Kellogg, Counsel for Bell Atlantic Corp. and Pacific Telesis
Group, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC 8-9 (Mar. 13, 1996) (on file with
the FCC in CC Docket No. 95-185) [hereinafter Kellogg Mar. 13 Letter]; Kellogg
Feb. 26 Letter, supra note 91, at 4 (arguing that the language of section 332(c)(3)(A)
refers to "the amount charged by CMRS providers to their subscribers, rather than
the amount CMRS providers pay for interconnection"); see also Petition of the State
of Ohio for Authority to Continue to Regulate Commercial Mobile Radio Service, 10
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the FCC must allow states to regulate CMRS if the state demon-
strates "market conditions with respect to such services fail to
protect subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable
rates.""' This language suggests that Congress intended to re-
strict the reach of the term "charged by" to rates charged to
wireless subscribers."' Second, the House Budget Committee
Report accompanying the bill states: "Section 332(c)(3) provides
that state or local governments cannot impose rate or entry
regulation on... commercial mobile services.""' This language
suggests that Congress intended the provision to apply only to
rates charged by CMRS providers for their wireless services.
This narrow interpretation of the scope of section 332(c)(3)'s pre-
emption language does not grant the FCC authority to regulate
intrastate LEC-CMRS rates.
Although section 332(c)(3)(A) does not preempt expressly state
regulation of transport and termination rates charged by LECs
to CMRS providers generally, the provision appears to preempt
state-authorized rates charged by LECs to CMRS providers that
constitute barriers to entry."4 Entry barriers presumably
would exist if interconnection or transport and termination rates
were so high as to inhibit the offering of commercial wireless
service." 5 Section 332(c)(3)(A), therefore, grants the FCC juris-
diction to regulate LEC intrastate interconnection and transport
and termination rates only when such circumstances exist.
F.C.C.R. 7842, 7853 (1995) (report and order) (equating section 332(c)(3) preemption
with "end-user rates").
111. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)(i) (1994) (emphasis added).
112. See Kellogg Feb. 26 Letter, supra note 91, at 4.
113. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 261 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CA-N. 378, 588
(emphasis added).
114. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (proscribing state regulation of "entry" into wire-
less service); LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM, supra note 37, at 5030 (noting that
in the CMRS Second Report and Order the FCC "declined to preempt state regula-
tion over the rates for intrastate interconnection, unless the charge for the intrastate
component of interconnection was so high that the price effectively precluded inter-
connection").
115. The Commission recognized that the actions of several state public utility
commissions prior to the 1996 Act "may constitute CMRS entry or rate regulation
preempted by section 332." Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,006-07.
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Amendment of Section 2(b) of the 1934 Act
Section 6002 of the Budget Act also amended section 2(b) of
the 1934 Act."' In general, section 2(b) denies the FCC juris-
diction over intrastate communications: "[Tihis provision fences
off from FCC reach or regulation intrastate matters-indeed, in-
cluding matters 'in connection with' intrastate service."" 7 Sec-
tion 2(b), however, lists a number of provisions of the 1934 Act
that are exceptions from this sweeping denial of jurisdiction."'
The Budget Act amended section 2(b) to provide that section 332
is one of these excepted provisions. The Budget Act thus re-
moved the restriction on FCC jurisdiction over intrastate com-
munications pursuant to section 332 and extended the
Commission's jurisdiction to include regulation of intrastate
LEC-CMRS interconnection rates."9
FCC Regulation of LEC-CMRS Interconnection Since the Budget
Act
Shortly after the enactment of the Budget Act, the FCC initi-
ated rulemaking to implement the provisions of the Act. 2' In
an order released in March 1994, the Commission addressed
many of the issues relating to LEC-CMRS interconnection.'2
The Commission adopted many of the requirements that it had
applied earlier to LEC-RCC interconnection in the RCC Inter-
116. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b)(2)(B)(i), 107 Stat. 312, 396 (1993). Section
2(b) of the 1934 Act, as amended, states: "Except as provided in ... section 332...,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or give the Commission jurisdic-
tion with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regu-
lations for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of
any carrier ... ." 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
117. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986).
118. Currently, sections 223 through 227 (inclusive), 301, 332, and Title VI of the
1934 Act, as amended, are excepted from jurisdictional limitation of section 2(b). See
47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
119. See Krattenmaker Memorandum, supra note 97, at 6-7; see also supra notes
68-71 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana Public Service Commission).
120. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, 8
F.C.C.R. 7988 (1993), summarized in 58 Fed. Reg. 53,169 (1993) (codified at 47
C.F.R. pts. 20, 22, 24, 80, 90) (proposed Oct. 14, 1993) [hereinafter CMRS NPRM].
121. See CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4.
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connection Ruling, 122 thus extending the reach of these provi-
sions to encompass interconnection between LECs and all CMRS
providers."i The Commission thus mandated LECs "to provide
reasonable and fair interconnection for all commercial mobile
radio services."" This mandate included a duty to negotiate
interconnection agreements in good faith." The FCC also
stated three requirements of reasonable interconnection. First,
the FCC imposed a mutual compensation requirement "under
which LECs shall compensate CMRS providers for the reason-
able costs incurred by such providers in terminating traffic that
originates on LEC facilities."'26 Second, the Commission re-
quired that "LECs shall establish reasonable charges for inter-
state interconnection provided to commercial mobile radio ser-
vice licensees."27 Third, the FCC required LECs to provide any
form of interconnection requested by a CMRS provider that the
LEC offered to other carriers, absent a showing by the LEC of
technical or economic infeasibility.
121
The FCC determined expressly that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over LEC intrastate interconnection rates,12 rejecting im-
plicitly arguments that section 332(c)(1)(B) or section
332(c)(3)(A) extended the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate
intrastate interconnection rates charged by LECs.13 In a later
122. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
123. See CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1497-98 ("We see no
distinction between a LEC's obligation to offer interconnection to [cellular] licensees
and all other CMRS providers ...
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 1498 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b)(1) (1996)). By its express terms,
the requirement does not restrict mutual compensation to interstate services. By re-
fraining from including an "interstate" qualification, the FCC may have intended to
extend implicitly its mutual compensation requirement to include intrastate LEC-
CMRS interconnection, even though it declined expressly to assert jurisdiction over
intrastate LEC-CMRS rates. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. This Note
argues that it had authority to impose mutual compensation for intrastate intercon-
nection and regulate interstate LEC-CMRS interconnection rates pursuant to sections
201 and 332(c)(1)(B) in tandem. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
127. CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1498.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. The Commission, however, indicated its belief that section 332(c)(3)(A) pre-
empts state regulation of interconnection rates charged by CMRS providers to other
[Vol. 39:229252
WIRELESS INTERCONNECTION
section of the order, the FCC acknowledged that Congress's
amendment of section 2(b).permitted the Commission to preempt
state intrastate regulation of CMRS notwithstanding Louisiana
Public Service Commission,13' but the Commission surprisingly
failed to recognize this amendment as an opportunity to extend
its jurisdiction to intrastate LEC-CMRS interconnection rates.
The FCC thus missed its first opportunity to exercise the juris-
dictional authority that Congress granted the agency in the
Budget Act.
The 1996 Act
The 1996 Act opened local telephone markets to competition
by removing state and local barriers to entry into telecommuni-
cations markets.'32 Although heralded as a "de-regulatory"
statute,'33 the 1996 Act in fact created an extensive regulatory
framework governing interconnection to the public switched net-
work."&I Sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act established a
"new model for interconnection""5 founded on negotiation and
arbitration of interconnection agreements.
Section 251 imposes interconnection obligations on three tiers
of telecommunications carriers. First, section 251(a)(1) requires
all telecommunications carriers "to interconnect directly or indi-
rectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunica-
tions carriers."3 6 Second, section 251(b)(5) obligates all LECs to
establish reciprocal compensation arrangements with intercon-
necting carriers."' Finally, section 251(c) imposes addition&
carriers, which presumably include LECs. See CMRS Second Report and Order,
supra note 4, at 1500; see also supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the preemption of state regulation of CMRS interconnection rates).
131. See CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1506.
132. "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal require-
ment, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to pro-
vide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a)
(West Supp. 1997).
133. See S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
134. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN.
L. REv. 123, 159 (1996).
135. S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 121.
136. 47. U.S.C. § 251(a)(1).
137. See id. § 251(b)(5).
1997] 253
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
obligations on incumbent LECs."' Section 251(c)(1) imposes a
duty on all incumbent LECs to negotiate reciprocal compensation
interconnection agreements in good faith in accordance with new
section 252"' of the amended 1934 Act.'40 In addition, section
251(c)(2) requires incumbent LECs to interconnect with any
requesting telecommunications carrier at any technically feasible
point within the LEC's network, and "on rates, terms, and condi-
tions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."""
These interconnection obligations-interconnection on just and
reasonable rates, terms, and conditions; good faith negotiation;
and reciprocal compensation--closely resemble the elements of
the reasonable interconnection standard established by the FCC
in the CMRS Second Report and Order.42
The provisions of section 252 govern procedures for the negoti-
ation and, if necessary, arbitration of interconnection agreements
with incumbent LECs." Section 252(a)(1) permits incumbent
LECs to negotiate binding interconnection agreements with re-
questing telecommunications carriers without regard to the obli-
gations in section 251(b) or (c).' Aside from negotiation, sec-
tion 252 provides for two alternative means of obtaining resolu-
tion of interconnection disputes: mediation and arbitration. Sec-
tion 252(a)(2) offers negotiating carriers the option of mediation
of disputes by state commissions."' Section 252(b) permits ei-
ther party negotiating an interconnection agreement to request
arbitration of unresolved issues by a state commission, but only
during a window of time beginning on the 135th day after the
incumbent LEC received the request for negotiation."'
138. See id. § 251(c).
139. See id. § 252.
140. See id. § 251(c)(1).
141. Id. § 251(c)(2)(D).
142. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
143. See 47 U.S.C-.A § 252.
144. See id. § 252(a)(1).
145. See id. § 252(a)(2). The term "State commission" relates to the state agency
that has jurisdiction over intrastate telecommunications, which is usually a state
public utility commission. See id. § 153(41).
146. See id. § 252(b)(1). The party requesting arbitration must petition the state
commission "[diuring the period from the 135th to the 160th day (inclusive) after the




Section 252 also provides standards applicable to state arbi-
trations. Among other requirements, state commissions must
ensure that: (1) interconnection rates are based on cost;'47 (2)
transport and termination rates are based on "a reasonable
approximation of the additional costs of terminating such
calls;" 148 and (3) agreements comply with FCC regulations in-
terpreting section 251.141
The 1996 Act also provides that state commissions must ap-
prove all interconnection agreements, whether adopted by volun-
tary negotiation or arbitration.' If the parties have negotiated
an interconnection agreement, then the state commission must
approve the agreement unless it finds one of two circumstances
exist: the agreement discriminates against a telecommunications
carrier not a party to the agreement,'5' or the agreement "is
not consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessi-
ty." 152 If the state commission arbitrated the agreement, how-
ever, then the state commission may only approve the agree-
ment if it meets the requirements of section 251 and the pricing
standards of section 252(d), which require cost-based rates for
interconnection and for transport and termination.'
The 1996 Act, therefore, establishes two different paths for
obtaining an interconnection agreement. The parties may negoti-
ate an agreement at any time, without regard to the intercon-
nection and cost-based pricing obligations of section 251." Al-
ternatively, after 135 days of attempted negotiation, a party may
request an arbitration.'55 Arbitrated agreements must comply
with the interconnection, reciprocal compensation, and pricing
requirements of section 251.' The 1996 Act, therefore, pro-
vides incentives for LECs to impose rates unrelated to costs on
CMRS providers in negotiated interconnection agreements, uti-
147. See id. § 252(c)(2), (d)(1)(A)(i).
148. Id § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii).
149. See id. § 252(c)(1).
150. See id. § 252(e)(1).
151. See id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(i).
152. Id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(ii).
153. See id. § 252(e)(2)(B).
154. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
155. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(b)(1).
156. See id. § 252(c)(2), (d), (e)(2)(B).
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lizing their greater bargaining power with respect to CMRS
providers.'57 If a CMRS provider fails to accept such rates,
then LECs may delay CMRS providers the opportunity to obtain
reciprocal compensation' by stalling negotiations.'59
FCC Interpretation of the 1996 Act: The Interconnection Order
The FCC's Interconnection Order,' released in August
1996, promulgated rules mandated by the 1996 Act to interpret
section 251161 and provided the FCC's interpretation of sections
251 and 252. The Commission stated that these sections "estab-
lish a uniform regulatory scheme governing interconnection
between incumbent LECs and all requesting carriers."'62 The
Commission concluded, therefore, that "[iut is consistent with the
broad authority of these provisions to hold that we may apply
sections 251 and 252 to LEC-CMRS interconnection."
163
The FCC viewed sections 251 and 252 "as creating parallel
jurisdiction for the FCC and the states."' Under this interpre-
tation of the 1996 Act, Congress granted the FCC authority to
establish implementing rules governing interstate and intrastate
interconnection, but granted state commissions authority to es-
tablish interstate and intrastate interconnection rates. 16
5
Remarkably, the FCC reached this conclusion even though "these
sections [251 and 2521 do not contain an explicit grant of intra-
state authority to the Commission or of interstate authority to
157. The FCC and numerous authorities have recognized that LECs possess signif-
icantly greater bargaining power than wireless carriers in the negotiation of inter-
connection agreements. See, e.g., Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,041; PE-
TER W. HUBER ET AL., THE GEODESIC NETWORK II: 1993 REPORT ON COMPEtITION IN
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 4.11 (1992); Comments of U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 16,
1996) (on file with the FCC in CC Docket No. 96-98), available in 1996 WL 393041,
at *7 [hereinafter DOJ Comments].
158. As of September 1996, the vast majority of LEC-CMRS interconnection
agreements did not provide mutual compensation. See Young, supra note 31, at 65.
159. See DOJ Comments, supra note 157, at *7.
160. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19.
161. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(1).
162. Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,005.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 15,544.
165. See id. at 15,544-45.
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the states."'66 By adopting this vision of "parallel jurisdiction,"
the FCC ceded jurisdiction over the arbitration of interconnection
agreements to the states: "we find that the states' authority pur-
suant to section 252 also extends to both interstate and intra-
state matters."6 7 Under the FCC's interpretation of the 1996
Act, state commissions may set both interstate and intrastate
LEC-CMRS interconnection rates in arbitration proceedings.
The FCC promulgated numerous implementing regulations
under its "parallel jurisdiction" for state commissions to follow in
the course of arbitrating or approving interconnection agree-
ments pursuant to sections 251 and 252." Among other provi-
sions, the regulations impose requirements for reciprocal com-
pensation,6 ' transport and termination rates set at "forward-
looking economic costs," 70 and renegotiation of nonreciprocal
LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements. 71
Although the FCC ceded its rate-setting authority to the state
commissions, it acknowledged that section 332 provides an alter-
native basis for jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection,
stating: "We acknowledge that section 332 in tandem with sec-
tion 201 is a basis for jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnec-
tion; we simply decline to define the precise extent of that juris-
diction at this time."72
Furthermore, the FCC noted that its decision to proceed under
sections 251 and 252 did not indicate any interpretation of
whether the 1996 Act repealed its section 332 jurisdiction over
166. Id. at 15,544.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 15,544-45.
169. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.703 (1996). The Eighth Circuit, however, vacated this sec-
tion except as it applies to LEC-CMRS interconnection. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC,
Nos. 96-3321 et al., 1997 WL 403401, at *9 & n.21 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
170. 47 C.F.R. § 51.705. The Eighth Circuit subsequently vacated this section. See
Iowa Utils. Bd., 1997 WL 403401, at *9 & n.21. "Forward-looking economic costs"
excludes embedded costs, which are costs that carriers have incurred in the past for
equipment, etc. 47 C.F.R. § 51-505(d).
171. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.717.
172. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,005. The FCC hinted, however,
that such jurisdiction would arise under section 332(c)(3) by stating: "We note that
Section 332 generally precludes states from rate and entry regulation of CMRS pro-
viders, and thus, differentiates CMPS providers from other carriers." Id. at 16,006.
1997] 257
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
LEC-CMRS interconnection.'73 Finally, the FCC noted that it
"preserve[d] the option to revisit this determination in the fu-
ture .... [if] the regulatory scheme established by sections 251
and 252 does not sufficiently address the problems encountered
by CMRS providers in obtaining interconnection on terms and
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."'
Notwithstanding this weak effort to preserve the option of as-
serting section 332 jurisdiction in the future, the FCC missed its
second opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over intrastate LEC-
CMRS interconnection by holding that sections 251 and 252
apply to LEC-CMRS interconnection.
FCC AUTHORITY TO REGULATE LEC-CMRS INTERCONNECTION
SUBSEQUENT TO THE 1996 ACT
Contrary to the Commission's decision in the Interconnection
Order, the FCC has authority to regulate intrastate LEC-CMRS
interconnection, even after the 1996 Act. The Budget Act ex-
panded the FCC's jurisdiction to reach intrastate aspects of
LEC-CMRS interconnection, 75 and the 1996 Act did not repeal
this jurisdictional authority.16
The FCC's jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection de-
rives from three statutory provisions. First, the Commission has
plenary jurisdiction over interstate aspects of interconnection,
including LEC-CMRS interconnection, pursuant to section
201.'" The FCC thus has jurisdiction to regulate interstate
interconnection rates charged by LECs to CMRS providers, and
the Commission has asserted this jurisdiction on numerous
occasions. 78 Second, section 332(c)(1)(B), in conjunction with
section 201, expands federal jurisdiction into the area of intra-
state LEC-CMRS interconnection. 7 9 Third, by amending sec-
tion 2(b) of the 1934 Act to recognize section 332 as an exception
173. See id. at 16,005.
174. Id. at 16,006.
175. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 183-99 and accompanying text.
177. See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
178. See, e.g., CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1498; RCC Inter-
connection Ruling, supra note 41, at 2911.
179. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
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to that provision, the Budget Act removed the barrier to federal
regulation of intrastate LEC-CMRS interconnection rates pur-
suant to section 332.180 Although Congress did not preempt ex-
pressly state regulation of intrastate LEC-CMRS interconnection
when it enacted section 332(c)(1)(B), as it did for retail CMRS
rates by enacting section 332(c)(3)," 1 Congress delegated the
FCC authority to preempt state regulation of LEC-CMRS inter-
connection rates.8 2
Moreover, because Congress did not repeal section 332 when
it enacted the 1996 Act, the FCC retains the intrastate authority
delegated to it by Congress in the Budget Act."s Congress may
repeal a statute either expressly or by implication.' The 1996
Act did not expressly repeal any provision of section 332. On the
contrary, two sections of the 1996 Act reveal Congress's intent
not to alter the FCC's section 201 or 332 jurisdiction. First,
section 253(e) of the Communications Act, as amended by the
1996 Act, states that "[niothing in this section shall affect the
application of section 332(c)(3) to commercial mobile service
providers, " "' indicating that Congress recognized the contin-
ued vitality of section 332. In addition, section 251(i) provides
180. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
182. Numerous parties that advanced this argument before the FCC argued that
section 332 granted the FCC exclusive jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection.
See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,002-03. Two state commissions, how-
ever, have indicated that the FCC and state commissions have concurrent jurisdic-
tion. See Re Establishment of Local Exchange Competition and Other Competitive Is-
sues, No. 95-845-TP-COI, 1997 WL 120529, at *14 (Ohio P.U.C. Feb. 20, 1997)
(commenting that "[ilnterconnection and compensation arrangements between LECs
and cellular carriers are subject to FCC and [Ohio] Commission rules"); Re Cost of
Providing Telecommunications Service, Order No. 96-283, 1996 WL 694711, at *14
(Or. P.U.C. Nov. 1, 1996) (stating that "LEC-CMRS compensation issues must...
be addressed at the federal level or in arbitration proceedings conducted under the
[1996] Act").
183. Cf Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186 n.9 (1988) (holding
that nothing in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919,
expresses an intent to repeal, or could be read to repeal implicitly, the Act of June
25, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-814, 49 Stat. 1938 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 290
(1994)).
184. See Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 186 n.9; Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First
Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986); Mercantile Nat' Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.
555, 565 (1963).
185. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(e) (West Supp. 1997).
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that "[niothing in this section shall be construed to limit or oth-
erwise affect the Commission's authority under section 201,"
186
thus declaring Congress's intent that the Commission retain its
jurisdiction over interconnection issues.
The Supreme Court stated the "cardinal rule" governing re-
peal by implication in TVA v. Hill: 7 "repeals by implication
are not favored."'88 The Court noted that, "[in practical terms,
this 'cardinal rule' means that '[in the absence of some affirma-
tive showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justi-
fication for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later
statutes are irreconcilable;""89 moreover, "the intention of the
legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest."'
Applying this rule to the 1996 Act, sections 251 and 252 repeal
section 332 only if Congress expressed a "clear and manifest"
intention to repeal section 332 or if these provisions are irrecon-
cilable. Neither proposition is supportable in this case. The legis-
lative history does not reveal an intent to repeal section 332.'
To the contrary, the legislative history suggests that Congress
enacted the 1996 Act as the second part of its reform of the 1934
Act: the Budget Act reformed regulation of the wireless industry,
and the 1996 Act extended regulatory reforms of the entire com-
munications industry.' The 1996 Act also contains a reference
186. Id. § 251(i).
187. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
188. Id. at 189 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974)).
189. TVA, 437 U.S. at 190 (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 550). The Court has stated
that "[olnly a clear repugnancy between the old law and the new results in the
former giving way." Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 457 (1945).
190. TVA, 437 U.S. at 189 (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497,
503 (1936)).
191. Indeed, the extensive legislative history of the 1996 Act does not evidence any
intent to repeal provisions of the Budget Act, despite the fact that Congress passed
the Budget Act only three years earlier and thus presumably was aware of the exis-
tence of that statute.
192. In hearings on legislation leading up to the 1996 Act, Representative Fields
commented:
Last year we began the process of building a national telecommunications
infrastructure when we adopted a regulatory framework for wireless tele-
communications services built on the same concepts contained in H.R.
3636. Today we are taking the next step in the process of crafting a
national telecommunications policy as we turn our attention to the other
sectors of the telecommunications industry.
260 [Vol. 39:229
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to section 332,... indicating that Congress intended section 332
to remain intact after the enactment of the 1996 Act.' In addi-
tion, section 601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act clearly states: "This Act
and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless
expressly so provided in such Act or amendments."'95
Furthermore, the 1996 Act and the Budget Act are not irrec-
oncilable. The jurisdiction granted to the FCC by section 332
applies exclusively to CMRS service and LEC-CMRS intercon-
nection issues. 9 The 1996 Act, however, applied to intercon-
nection with LECs in general. 9 Arguably, either statute can
govern LEC-CMRS interconnection. The rule of statutory con-
struction that a specific statutory provision takes precedence
over a subsequent, general statute resolves this conflict.'98 Fol-
lowing this rule, section 332, which governs the narrow field of
LEC-CMRS interconnection, takes precedence over sections 251
and 252 of the 1996 Act, which apply generally to interconnec-
tion between LECs and telecommunications carriers.'99 The
FCC, as the administrative agency granted authority to imple-
National Communications Infrastructure (Part 2): Hearings on H.R. 3626 and H.R.
3636 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 103d Cong. 117 (1993) (statement of Rep. Fields).
193. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(e) (West Supp. 1997); supra text accompanying note
185.
194. See Laurens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 365 U.S.
517, 523 (1961) (stating that it 'would be difficult to think of less apt circumstances
for the finding of an implied repeal" when Congress passed two closely-related acts
within a year of each other).
195. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(c)(1), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56, 143 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note). As noted above, Congress did not expressly repeal
section 201 or 332. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 79-102 and accompanying text.
197. The 1996 Act applies to LEC interconnection with "telecommunications carri-
ers." See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
198. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 551 (1988). "[Wihen two statutes are
capable of c-existence,' we must conclude that the earlier, more specific provi-
sions . . .were neither expressly nor implicitly repealed by the later, more general
provisions ... ." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551 (1974)).
199. This approach is also consistent with the rule of statutory construction that,
"where possible, provisions of a statute should be read so as not to create a con-
flict." Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986).
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ment the 1934 and 1996 Acts,200 may resolve this conflict in
light of its considerable expertise in this field and its extensive
knowledge of the CMRS industry.0 1
The Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Iowa Utilities Board v.
FCC20 2 provides support for this interpretation of the FCC's
present authority. In that case, a number of state commissions
and incumbent LECs challenged the authority of the FCC to
issue the pricing rules contained in the Interconnection Order
relating to interconnection, transport and termination, and other
203services. After the consolidation of numerous appeals and
the subsequent assignment to the Eighth Circuit,24 the court
vacated the pricing rules, concluding that the FCC lacked juris-
diction to issue rules governing intrastate telecommunica-
tions.20 5 After noting that "section 2(b) 'fences off intrastate
matters from FCC regulation,"26 the court determined that
"the FCC's interpretation of the Act does not demonstrate an
unambiguous grant of intrastate authority to the FCC required
either to jump over or pass through section 2(b)'s fence."20 7
The Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, however,
with regard to LEC-CMRS interconnection. The court stated:
Because Congress expressly amended section 2(b) to preclude
state regulation of entry of and rates charged by Commercial
Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers, see 47 U.S.C. §§
152(b) (exempting the provisions of section 332), 332(c)(3)(A),
and because section 332(c)(1)(B) gives the FCC the authority
to order LECs to interconnect with CMRS carriers, we believe
that the Commission has the authority to issue the rules of
200. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
201. Under the rule established in Chevron U.SA Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984), the FCC's interpretation of the rela-
tionship between the Budget Act and the 1996 Act, if challenged, would be entitled
to deference. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321 et al., 1997 WL 403401, at
*2 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
202. 1997 WL 403401.
203. See id. at *2. The pricing rules refer to 47 C.F.R. § 51.501-.515, .601-.611,
.701-.717 (1996), excluding § 51.515(b). See id. at *9 n.21.
204. See id. at *2.
205. See id. at *9.
206. Id. at *5 (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370
(1986)).
207. Id. at *6.
262 [Vol. 39:229
WIRELESS INTERCONNECTION
special concern to the CMRS providers... but only as these
provisions apply to CMRS providers.2
The court thus recognized that section 332 provides the FCC
with intrastate authority over LEC-CMRS interconnection rates,
and that this authority remains in full force after the 1996
Act.0 9 Significantly, this holding dispels the arguments ad-
vanced by the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) that
the 1996 Act removed the FCC's authority to regulate LEC-
CMRS interconnection rates.210
The Inseverability Exception Alternative
As an alternative to the jurisdictional argument discussed
above, the FCC may assert jurisdiction over intrastate LEC-
CMRS interconnection under the inseverability doctrine recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Louisiana Public Service Com-
mission v. FCC.2 ' Under this doctrine, the FCC may exercise
jurisdiction over intrastate matters when it is "not possible to
separate the interstate and the intrastate components of the
asserted FCC regulation."' 2
In the context of LEC-CMRS interconnection, the FCC can
assert that the costs of interstate and intrastate interconnection
are not severable given the nature of mobile telephony.23 The
208. Id. at *9 n.21 (citations omitted).
209. Although the Eighth Circuit's analysis relied on section 332(c)(3) and failed to
consider the FCC's authority to regulate intrastate interconnection rates pursuant to
section 201(b) in tandem with section 332(c)(1)(B), the court's holding nevertheless
recognized that Congress's amendment of section 2(b) extended the FCC's jurisdiction
with regard to LEC-CMRS interconnection.
210. See, e.g., Kellogg Mar. 13 Letter, supra note 110, at 3. The Eighth Circuit
upheld, among other provisions, FCC regulations requiring mutual compensation for
CMRS providers; prohibiting LEC charges to CMRS providers for traffic originated
on LEC networks; imposing symmetrical LEC-CMRS mutual compensation rates; and
authorizing renegotiation of existing nonreciprocal LEC-CMRS interconnection
agreements. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 1997 WL 403401, at *9 n.21.
211. 476 U.S. 355 (1986); see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
212. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 375 n.4.
213. Undoubtedly, the Commission retains its section 201 jurisdiction over inter-
state interconnection after the 1996 Act, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(i) (West Supp. 1997),
despite the Commission's contrary conclusion in the Interconnection Order. See supra
notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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FCC tentatively reached this conclusion when it last considered
the matter in 1996:
We note that much of the LEC-CMRS traffic that may appear
to be intrastate may actually be interstate, because CMRS
service areas often cross state lines, and CMRS customers are
mobile. For example, if a cellular customer from Richmond
travels to Baltimore and then places a call to Alexandria, the
call might appear to be an intrastate call, placed from a Vir-
ginia telephone number to another Virginia number, but
would in fact be interstate because the call originates in
Maryland and terminates in Virginia. Service areas defined
as "local" in wireless providers' rate structure do not coincide
with LEC "exchanges"... subject to state authority, and
often cross state lines. This is true of many existing cellular
providers, and is even more likely to be true with respect to
PCS licensees in major trading areas (MTAs).214
Because LECs or wireless carriers cannot determine the
exact location of the sender or recipient of a telephone call,
the carriers cannot always determine whether the call is inter-
state215 or intrastate.216 This problem is unique to mobile
communications, where handsets or pagers are portable and
travel across state lines.1 7 Because the FCC has licensed
CMRS services with service areas that do not conform to state
boundaries, this problem has grown in recent years.2 8 The
214. LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM, supra note 37, at 5073 (footnote omitted).
215. See supra note 55.
216. See Comments of the Personal Communications Indus. Ass'n 12 (Apr. 12, 1996)
(on file with the FCC in CC Docket No. 96-45) [hereinafter PCIA Comments] ("At
present, CNIRS licensees do not separate their costs and revenues on an inter-
state/intrastate basis, and in many cases there is no practical way to do so.") (em-
phasis added); Krattenmaker Memorandum, supra note 97, at 13.
217. See Krattenmaker Memorandum, supra note 97, at 14; PCIA Comments, supra
note 216, at 11 (stating that "many [CMRS] calls begin as intrastate calls and be-
come interstate calls, or vice versa, as the call crosses and re-crosses state lines").
218. See Krattenmaker Memorandum, supra note 97, at 13-14; Verveer Letter, su-
pra note 105, at 12. For example, the FCC issued PCS licenses for service areas
based upon MTAs and Basic Trading Areas (BTAs). See 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.102, 24.202
(1996). These service areas do not conform to state boundaries. See PCIA Comments,
supra note 216, at 11; Comments of Vanguard Cellular Sys., Inc. 6 (Apr. 12, 1996)
(on file with the FCC in CC Docket No. 96-45) [hereinafter Vanguard Comments].
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issue also arises when cellular service providers operate
multistate service areas. 19
On at least two prior occasions, the FCC reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that interstate and intrastate LEC-CMRS
interconnection costs are severableY.2 0 Events, however, have
overtaken those earlier decisions." 1 Moreover, the FCC's recog-
nition of an inseverability problem is consistent with the House
Budget Committee's determination that "mobile services.., by
their nature, operate without regard to state lines."222
The remainder of this Note discusses considerations that sup-
port the FCC's exercise of its section 332 jurisdiction.
CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION OVER LEC-CMRS INTERCONNECTION
Discriminatory Treatment of CMRS Providers Prior to the
Interconnection Order
Prior to the Interconnection Order, LECs had established a
history of discriminatory practices against wireless carriers.22
Similarly, the FCC issued certain SMR licenses for service areas based upon "Eco-
nomic Areas." See 47 C.F.R. § 90.681. These areas generally include parts of two or
more states. See PCIA Comments, supra note 216, at 11; Vanguard Comments, su-
pra, at 6; see also 47 C.F.R. § 90.7 (defining "Economic Area").
219. See Vanguard Comments, supra note 218, at 6.
220. See CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1498; RCC Interconnec-
tion Ruling, supra note 41, at 2912.
221. For example, PCS service is a recent phenomenon. The FCC awarded the first
99 PCS licenses on June 23, 1995. See Lisa M. Warner, Wireless Technologies Creat-
ing Competition in the Local Exchange Market: How Will Local Exchange Carriers
Compete?, 4 COMmLAW CONSPECTUS 51, 58-60 (1996). American Personal Communica-
tions (APC) began operation of the first PCS service in Washington, D.C. in 1996.
See Possible 'Retreat' by FCC on Bill-&-Keep Concerns PCS Licensees, COMM. DAILY,
June 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2368858.
222. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 260 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587.
223. In a statement released with the Interconnection Order, Commissioner Chong
observed:
CMRS providers have suffered past discrimination at the hand of the
LECs and by certain state commissions with regard to interconnection
matters. Today's record is replete with examples of LECs that have sig-
nificantly overcharged CMRS providers for past interconnection. Further,
in violation of our rules, our record reflects that in some cases, LECs
have'refused to pay CMRS providers for calls terminated by LECs on the
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A 1987 study commissioned by the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice determined that several of the RBOCs2"
offered wireless providers interconnection of inferior quality'
or charged CMRS providers interconnection rates unrelated to
the cost of providing service.226 In 1994, the House Judiciary
Committee issued a report that noted: "Since divestiture [of
AT&T], the RBOCs have been found to have committed a num-
ber of anticompetitive acts, including impeding competition
in... cellular telephone services ... . These experiences high-
light the propensity of various RBOCs to exploit their monopoly
power and indicate the continuing limitations of Federal and
State regulatory capabilities."227 As recently as 1997, the FCC
issued a decision ordering a LEC to provide Type 2' intercon-
CMRS networks, while other wireline carriers have received such com-
pensation from the LECs. In other instances, LECs have required certain
CMRS providers to pay for the traffic the LEC carrier originates and
terminates on the systems of the CMRS provider. These problems have
been compounded by certain state commissions who have limited access
by CMRS providers to more reasonable interconnection rates afforded by
LECs to other wireline carriers.
Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,252 (separate statement of Comm'r
Chong).
224. The divestiture of AT&T in 1982 created seven RBOCs: Ameritech, Bell At-
lantic Corporation (Bell Atlantic), BellSouth Corporation (BellSouth), NYNEX Corpo-
ration (NYNEX), Pacific Telesis Group (Pacific Telesis), Southwestern Bell Corpora-
tion (SBC), and US West, Inc. (US West). See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
969 F.2d 1231, 1233 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
SBC and Pacific Telesis merged on April 1, 1997. See SBC and Pacific Telesis
Complete Merger, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3943341. SBC is
the name of this newly-created company. See id.
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX merged on Aug. 14, 1997, following FCC approval of
the $21 billion merger subject to eight pro-competitive conditions. See FCC Approves
$21-Billion Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Merger with 8 Conditions, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 15,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3946917. The U.S. Department of Justice, public utility
commissions in states served by the two companies, and shareholders of both compa-
nies had already approved the merger. See Justice Dept. Gives Nod to $23-Billion
BA-NYNEX Merger, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3943899.
225. See HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.13 (stating that "[for a period, several BOCs
refused to provide Type 2 interconnection to non-wireline carriers").
226. See id. at 4.17 (noting that LECs charged the same rates for Type 2 service,
"even though Type 2 interconnection is less costly to the BOC").
227. H.R. REP. No. 103-559, pt. 2, at 58-59 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
228. Type 2 interconnection provides CMRS providers with improved transmission qual-
ity and lower interconnection costs than Type 1 interconnection. See HUBER ET. AL., supra
note 157, at 4.7 n.35; see also supra note 65 (defining Type 1 and Type 2 interconnection).
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nection to a paging company after the LEC repeatedly refused to
provide this type of interconnection." 9
Past discriminatory practices by LECs generally fell into one
of two categories: (1) refusal to provide reciprocal compensation;
and (2) charging CMRS providers discriminatory rates for inter-
connection or other services.
Refusal to Provide Reciprocal Compensation
Historically, most LECs refused to compensate CMRS provid-
ers for terminating calls to wireless subscribers even though,
like LECs, CMRS providers incurred costs in terminating traf-
fic.' 0 This practice contrasted starkly with the mutual com-
pensation agreements between LECs. 1 LECs justified this
practice by insisting CMRS providers were end-users rather
than common carriers. 2 Using this rationale, LECs in many
cases billed wireless carriers for the costs they incurred in deliv-
ering calls to the CMRS providers."5 Under these arrange-
ments, LECs passed the entire cost of LEO to CMRS calls onto
wireless carriers and forced wireless carriers to bear the entire
cost of CMRS to LEC calls.
Numerous state commissions endorsed these practices, deny-
ing CMRS providers reciprocal compensation.' State commis-
sions justified these actions by stating that reciprocal compensa-
229. See Bowles v. United Tel. Co., No. E-96-04, 1997 WL 383651, at *3, *8 (F.C.C.
July 11, 1997). Although the FCC issued the decision in 1997, the LEC's discrimina-
tory practice occurred between 1993 and 1995. See id. at *3.
230. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,010, 16,039; HUBER, supra
note 25, at 4.18; HUBER ET. AL., supra note 157, at 4.11 n.53; Madison, supra note
42, at 80.
231. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
232. See HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.18; HUBER ET. AL., supra note 157, at 4.11
n.53.
233. See HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.18; HUBER ET. AL., supra note 157, at 4.11
n.53.
234. See, e.g., CyberTel Cellular Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 94 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 120, 125-26 (Mo. P.S.C. 1988); Re Regulation of Cellular Radio-
telephone Utils., 36 Cal. P.U.C.2d 464, 497 (Cal. P.U.C. 1990); Investigation into the
Interconnection of Mobile Carriers with Facilities of Local Exchange Companies, No.
20475, 1988 Fla. PUC LEXIS 1883, at *18-20 (Fla. P.S.C. Dec. 20, 1988) [hereinafter
Florida LEC-CMRS Order]; Re Cellular Radio Telecomms. Cos., 75 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 327, 343 (N.C.U.C. 1986).
1997] 267
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:229
tion would increase LEC costs and thus raise local telephone
rates, 5 or that wireless subscribers received the benefits of
LEC-to-CMRS traffic and thus should pay for termination of
such calls." State commissions continued to reject reciprocal
compensation even after the FCC promulgated regulations in
1994 requiring mutual compensation. 7 These state actions
reflected the willingness of some state commissions to treat
CMRS providers in a discriminatory manner.
Discriminatory LEC-CMRS Rates
In addition to refusing to provide reciprocal compensation,
LECs customarily charged higher interconnection rates to CMRS
providers than to other carriers. On average, LECs charged
CMRS providers interconnection rates of approximately three
cents per minute," compared to rates of approximately one
cent per minute for other wireline carriers.2 State commis-
235. See CyberTel, 94 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 126; Re Regulation of Cellular
Radiotelephone Utils., 36 Cal. P.U.C.2d at 497; Florida LEC-CMRS Order, supra
note 234, at *19. The Florida Public Service Commission reached this conclusion
after acknowledging that termination of calls by CMRS providers results in LEC cost
savings. See Florida LEC-CMRS Order, supra note 234, at *18-19.
236. See CyberTel, 94 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 126; Florida LEC-CMRS Order,
supra note 234, at *20; Re Cellular Radio Telecomms. Cos., 75 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) at 343.
237. See, e.g., Re Investigation into the Rates for Interconnection of Mobile Service
Providers with Facilities of Local Exchange Companies, No. 940235-TL, 1995 WL
619723, at *25 (Fla. P.S.C. Oct. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Florida Second LEC-CMRS
Order] (reaffirming nonreciprocal compensation ruling); see also supra note 126 and
accompanying text (discussing the FCC's mutual compensation requirement). The reg-
ulation is codified at 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b) (1996).
238. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 15,927 (citing comments submit-
ted by CTIA, a trade organization representing many cellular providers, stating the
nationwide average LEC-CMRS interconnection rate); Young, supra note 31, at 65
(estimating that the 1996 national average rate for Type 2A interconnection was
2.86¢ per minute). Some LEC interconnection rates were significantly higher. For
example, the average Type 2A rates charged by NYNEX and Pacific Bell exceeded
4¢ per minute, see id., and the average Type 1 rates charged by Bell Atlantic and
NYNEX exceeded 9¢ per minute. See id.
239. See LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM, supra note 37, at 5054 (stating that
the median termination rate charged by LECs to competing wireline carriers is ap-
proximately 1¢ per minute); Newman, supra note 26, at 78 (noting that LEC costs
are less than 1¢ per minute); see also Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at
15,927 (citing a CTIA survey of LEC-LEC interconnection agreements in 18 states
268
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sions, which generally regulated these LEC-CMRS interconnec-
tion rates,"4 approved such rates in some instances because
CMRS providers did not contribute to state universal service
funds."'
State commissions and incumbent LECs adopted other prac-
tices that discriminated against wireless providers.4 2 Many
LECs charged CMRS providers substantial fees for activation of
NXX codes,"5 while at the same time charging other LECs sig-
nificantly lower fees or no fee at all.' Some state commissions
approved LEC tariffs imposing such charges, even though these
charges discriminated against CMRS providers. 5
that revealed interconnection rates significantly below the 30 per minute average
LEC-CMRS rate).
240. See HUBER, supra note 25, at 4.15.
241. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 15,925-26 (commenting that
CMRS providers in New York could pay an interconnection rate of less than 1€ per
minute if they complied with state universal service obligations; otherwise, the rate
was 2.6¢ per minute).
"Universal service" broadly refers to the system that subsidizes basic local tele-
phone service and provides local telephone service to low-income households at subsi-
dized rates. See Riley K. Temple, Universal Service and the 1996 Act, in 14TH AN-
NUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS 87, 92-94 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 465, 1996). The FCC op-
erates a Universal Service Fund that subsidizes LECs "whose costs exceedD the na-
tional average." Id. at 94. In addition, states operate separate universal service
funds to subsidize the cost of providing low cost telephone service to residential cus-
tomers by LECs within each state. See id. at 95. States require LECs and competing
wireline providers to contribute to universal service funds. See id.
242. For example, some Florida LECs failed to flow through interconnection rate
reductions to CMRS providers, although a state commission order required such re-
ductions. See Florida Second LEC-CMRS Order, supra note 237, at *9.
243. For a definition of an NXX code, see supra note 74.
244. See Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion into Com-
petition for Local Exchange Service, Decision 96-12-067, 1996 WL 752451, at *7 (Cal.
P.U.C. Dec. 20, 1996) ("[W]e conclude that Pacific [Bel]'s practice of charging code
opening fees to cellular carriers and other CMRS providers is unacceptable since
such charges are discriminatory."); Florida Second LEC-CMRS Order, supra note 237,
at *14 (summarizing testimony stating that no LECs in Florida impose NXX code
activation fees on other LECs); Harry E. Young, Interconnection Update: BIG Sav-
ings, CELLULAR BUS., Nov. 1996, at 26, 26 (stating that LECs charged CMRS pro-
viders fees significantly higher than those charged to other LECs).
245. See, e.g., Florida Second LEC-CMRS Order, supra note 237, at *14-15 (ap-
proving tariffed rates for NXX charges for CMRS providers after reviewing evidence
that LECs did not impose such charges on other wireline carriers).
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Treatment of CMRS Providers Subsequent to the Interconnection
Order
Acting on numerous petitions to stay the FCC Interconnection
Order, the Eighth Circuit stayed the effective date of the Order
on September 27, 1996." 6 On November 1, 1996, the Eighth
Circuit lifted the stay with regard to three provisions affecting
LEC-CMRS interconnection, including the "fresh look" provision,
which authorizes CMRS providers to renegotiate nonreciprocal
interconnection agreements without penalty. 7 Subsequently,
many CMRS providers entered into negotiations with LECs to
renegotiate their existing nonreciprocal interconnection agree-
ments. 8
As a result of these negotiations, many CMRS providers ob-
tained or will obtain one of their prime objectives with respect to
interconnection-reciprocal compensation.249  In addition,
CMRS providers have obtained interconnection rates consider-
ably below the nationwide average rate that existed prior to the
1996 Act."0 Yet significant problems remain.
First, not all LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements entered
into subsequent to the 1996 Act have achieved symmetry in
reciprocal compensation rates." Following the Eighth Circuit's
246. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 96 F.3d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1996). On October
15, 1996, the Eighth Circuit dissolved this stay of the entire Order and replaced it
with a stay of the Orders pricing provisions, see supra note 203, and other provi-
sions of the Order. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 427 (8th Cir. 1996),
motion to vacate stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996), and motion to vacate stay de-
nied sub nom., Association for Local Telecomms. Servs. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 117 S. Ct.
429 (1996).
247. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321 et al. (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 1996)
<http-l/ls.wustl.edu8th.cir/Opinions/FCC/963321.019> (lifting stay with respect to 47
C.F.R. §§ 51.701, 51.703, and 51.717) (196). Section 51.717 codifies the "fresh look"
provision.
248. See Harry E. Young, Interconnection Negotiations, CELLULAR BUS., June 1997,
at 60, 60.
249. See id. at 64-66; supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
250. See Young, supra note 248, at 66; see also Telephony, COMM. DAILY, July 9,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3945895 (noting that PriCellular may obtain interconnec-
tion rate reductions of more than 60% in New York following renegotiation of its
agreement).
251. See, e.g., Ameritech Illinois, No. 96 NA-001, 1996 Ill. PUC LEXIS 336, at *5-
*7, *26 (I. Commerce Comm'n June 26, 1996) (approving an interconnection
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decision in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 2 which affirmed the
FCC's regulation requiring symmetrical reciprocal compensation
rates with respect to LEC-CMRS interconnection," s LECs may
no longer impose such agreements on CMRS providers.' Iowa
Utilities Board, however, does not enable CMRS providers that
entered into nonsymmetrical agreements prior to that decision
to renegotiate them. 5
Second, review of LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements
approved by state commissions since the Interconnection Order
suggests that LECs have used their greater bargaining
power" to negotiate transport and termination rates signifi-
cantly above additional or incremental cost." In the Intercon-
nection Order, the FCC presented an extensive analysis of incre-
mental cost data for interconnection services and concluded that
the "additional costs" of transport and termination should ap-
proximate .2¢-.4¢ per minute for end-office switchinge' and
.15V per minute for tandem switching,29 if required by the
agreement that provides for nonsymmetrical reciprocal rates between Ameritech Illi-
nois and Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. (SBMS), a cellular service provider,
for the first three years of the agreement); Young, supra note 248, at 64 (observing
that nonsymmetrical rates exist in recently approved LEC-CMRS interconnection
agreements in California).
Under the terms of the Ameritech-SBMS agreement, during the first three years
SBMS must compensate Ameritech at a rate higher than that paid by Ameritech to
SBMS. See Ameritech illinois, 1996 Ill. PUC Lexis 336, at *5-*6. Only after July 1,
1999, does the mutual compensation arrangement achieve rate symmetry. See id at
*6.
252. Nos. 96-3321 et al., 1997 WL 403401 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
253. See id. at *9 n.21.
254. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.711(a) (1996).
255. The FCC "fresh look" provision only permits renegotiation of nonreciprocal
interconnection agreements. See id. § 51.717.
256. See supra note 157.
257. Under the 1996 Act, negotiated interconnection agreements need not comply
with the incremental cost pricing requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii) (West
Supp. 1997). See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
258. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 15,905-07, 16,026-27 (codified at
47 C.F.R. § 51.513(c)(2), .707(b)(1)). The FCC noted that "the most credible evidence
in the record suggests that the actual forward-looking economic cost of end-office
switching is closer to 0.2 cents ($0.002) per minute of use." See id at 16,030. End-
office switching is the principal component of "termination." See supra note 33.
259. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 15,910-11 (codified at 47 C.F.R. §
51.513(c)(5)). Tandem switching is a substantial component of "transport" where a
CMRS provider interconnects* at a LEC's tandem switch. See supra note 32. The
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LEC-CMRS interconnection configuration.26 According to the
FCC, therefore, transport and termination "additional costs"
should approximate .2g-.550 per minute.26' Numerous negoti-
ated LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements resulted in trans-
port and termination rates significantly in excess of these rates,
however.262
FCC also concluded that dedicated transport costs are reflected approximately by
existing LEC tariffed rates. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 15,909
(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 51.513(c)(3)).
260. The FCC concluded that state commissions may set interim transport and
termination rates on the basis of either LECs' actual additional costs, measured ac-
cording to economic cost studies, or these "default proxies." See Interconnection Or-
der, supra note 19, at 15,891-92 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 51.705(a)). In Iowa Utilities
Board, the Eighth Circuit vacated the FCC's pricing provisions, including sections
51.513 and 51.705, holding that section 2(b) removed the FCC's jurisdiction with re-
spect to intrastate rate regulation. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321 et al.,
1997 WL 403401, at *9 & n.21 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997). The FCC's analysis of data
regarding the costs of transport and termination, however, remains valid. See id.
261. If a CMRS provider interconnects its MTSO with a LEC at the LEC's tandem
switch rather than at an end-office switch, the LEO incurs tandem switching costs
in addition to end-office switching costs to complete a call. See Interconnection Or-
der, supra note 19, at 15,910-11. A LEC's interconnection costs will thus vary ac-
cording to where the wireless carrier interconnects with the LEC, hence the .2g-.550
per minute range of estimated costs.
The FCC affirmed its cost estimates with regard to end-office transport and
termination costs on reconsideration of this aspect of the Interconnection Order. See
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 13,042, 13,045 (1996) (order on reconsideration), reprinted in
part in 61 Fed. Reg. 52,706 (1996). Moreover, these cost estimates have gained va-
lidity from recent LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements that established rates with-
in this expected range. See, e.g., In re Joint Application of Bell Atlantic-New Jersey,
Inc. and Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc. for Approval of an Interconnection Agree-
ment under Section 252(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, No. T097030162,
1997 WL 312600, at *2 (N.J.B.P.U. May 28, 1997) (establishing transport and termi-
nation rates of .3¢-.5g per minute depending on the interconnection configuration);
Re Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., No. T097020077, 1997 WL 188147, at *2
(N.J.B.P.U. Apr. 2, 1997) (establishing an end-office termination rate of .3¢ per min-
ute and a rate of .5¢ per minute for termination at a tandem switch).
262. See, e.g., Request by BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. for Approval of In-
terconnection Agreement with Vanguard Cellular Financial Corp., No. 970228-TP,
1997 WL 374350, at *20 (Fla. P.S.C. June 11, 1997) (setting an end-office termina-
tion rate of 1.75g per minute for traffic interconnected with BellSouth in Tennessee);
Re Vanguard Cellular Financial Corp., No. 97-027, 1997 WL 295239, at *6 (Me.
P.U.C. Apr. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Maine Vanguard Agreement] (providing for a Type
2A interconnection rate of 1.5€ per minute). Type 2A interconnection involves inter-
connection at a LEC's tandem switch. See supra note 65.
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Even though most interconnection agreements negotiated
since the 1996 Act include symmetrical reciprocal compensa-
tion,"s LECs derive significant benefits from obtaining high in-
terconnection rates because traffic between wireline and wireless
networks is unbalanced."6 According to many industry sourc-
es, LEC-CMRS traffic flows are substantially unbalanced: more
than eighty percent of LEC-CMRS traffic originates on the wire-
less network and terminates on the wireline network." With
this substantial imbalance of traffic flows, LECs have a financial
and competitive interest in negotiating high interconnection
rates. Recent decisions suggest that some LECs have taken
advantage of their market power to achieve rates significantly
higher than FCC-estimated costs."
Third, in numerous interconnection agreements, LECs negoti-
ated Type 2A interconnection rates equal to, or greater than,
Type 1 interconnection rates,26 7 even though there is clear evi-
263. See Young, supra hote 248, at 64-66.
264. See LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM, supra note 37, at 5027 ("LECs typi-
cally terminate many more calls that originate from the cellular network than an in-
terconnecting cellular network terminates LEC-originated calls.... Because of this
imbalance, LECs clearly would benefit competitively from maintaining high, even if
symmetrical, interconnection charges.&") (emphasis added). LECs, therefore, "may seek
to impose unduly high interconnection rates or other unreasonable conditions that
could reduce CMRS entry." LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM, supra note 37, at
5062.
265. See, e.g., Jason Meyers, The Interconnection Schism, TELEPHONY, Mar. 18,
1996, at 14, 14 (noting claims by the United States Telephone Association, the lead-
ing LEC trade association, that LECs terminate CMRS-to-LEC calls 94% of the
time); Newman, supra note 26, at 80 (stating that approximately 82% of residential
cellular calls are outgoing); Young, supra note 31, at 65 (stating that presently 80%
of LEC-CMRS traffic originates on the wireless network, but estimating that the
figure will fall to 60% by 2006).
266. See, e.g., Request by BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. for Approval of In-
terconnection Agreement with Vanguard Cellular Financial Corp., No. 970228-TP,
1997 WL 374350, at *20 (Fla. P.S.C. June 11, 1997) (noting that BellSouth achieved
an end-office interconnection rate of 1.750 per minute in one agreement, more than
four times the FCC's high-end estimate of .4¢ per minute); Young, supra note 248,
at 64 (presenting data on interconnection rates in recently approved interconnection
agreements which reveal that Type 2A termination rates approved in Los Angeles
and Seattle are more than double FCC-estimated costs).
267. See, e.g., Request for Approval of Interconnection Agreement Negotiated by
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. with Palmer Wireless, Inc., No. 970260-TP, 1997
WL 377371, at *19 (Fla. P.S.C. June 19, 1997) (providing for an identical rate of
1.5860 per minute for Type 1 and Type 2A interconnection in South Carolina);
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dence that Type 2A interconnection is less costly for LECs to
provide.21 Moreover, CMRS providers favor Type 2A intercon-
nection.2 19 These negotiation results suggest that LECs are us-
ing their greater bargaining power to negotiate Type 2A inter-
connection rates considerably above cost.
Fourth, some LECs persist in refusing to compensate paging
carriers for terminating calls on paging networks, and in fact
are imposing charges on paging carriers for calls originating on
the wireline network. 7 0 This practice persists more than three
years after the FCC mandated mutual compensation for all
CMRS providers, including paging companies.7 1 These practic-
es are similar to those of many LECs with regard to cellular
carriers prior to the 1996 Act.272 Due to the passage of the
1996 Act, however, such discriminatory practices also violate the
reciprocal compensation requirement of section 251(b)(5) and
FCC regulations implementing the 1996 Act.27
3
Maine Vanguard Agreement,- supra note 262, at *6 (providing a Type 1 rate of .8¢
per minute and a Type 2A rate of 1.5€ per minute).
268. See Bowles v. United Tel. Co., File No. E-96-04, 1997 WL 383651, at *2
(F.C.C. July 11, 1997) (citing RCC Reconsideration Order, supra note 41, at 2373);
see also supra note 65 (defining Type 1 and Type 2 interconnection).
269. See supra note 65.
270. See, e.g., Reply Comments of the Paging and Narrowband PCS Alliance of the
Personal Communications Indus. Ass'n 2-3 (June 27, 1997) (on file with the FCC in
CC Docket No. 96-98); Letter from Cathleen A. Massey, AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc.,
et al., to Regina M. Keeney, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC 1-2 (Jan. 30,
1997) (on file with the FCC in CC Docket No. 96-98).
271. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
273. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(b)(5) (West Supp. 1997); 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b) (1996);
see also Letter from Regina M. Keeney, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, to
Cathleen A. Massey, AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (Mar. 3, 1997), available in 1997
WL 117463, at *2 (noting that "section 251(b)(5) ... prohibits LECs from charging
CMRS carriers to terminate traffic that driginates on the LECs' networks").
Two state commission arbitration decisions recently recognized that paging com-
panies may collect transport and termination costs from LECs. See Application of
Cook Telecom, Inc., for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252 of the Federal Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 to Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Pacific Bell,
Decision 97-05-095, 1997 WL 383634, at *2-*3 (Cal. P.U.C. May 21, 1997); In re Pe-
tition of AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc. for Arbitration of an Interconnection Agreement
with US West Communications, Inc., Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(b), No. P-421/EM-
97-371, 1997 Minn. PUC LEXIS 118, at *28 (Minn. P.U.C. July 30, 1997). Whether
LECs will modify their practices as a result of these decisions is unclear.
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Fifth, at least one state commission has ordered that cellular
service providers may not renegotiate existing interconnection
agreements with incumbent LECs,2 even though the FCC
promulgated a "fresh look" rule in the Interconnection Or-
der,275 and the Eighth Circuit removed its stay of this rule on
November 1, 1996.27' This state commission ruling prevents
cellular service providers in Louisiana from renegotiating exist-
ing nonreciprocal interconnection agreements, and thus prevents
these carriers from obtaining reciprocal compensation until their
existing interconnection contracts expire.
Finally, FCC Commissioner Chong recently identified addi-
tional unfair practices by LECs toward CMRS providers, includ-
ing refusing to give wireless carriers interconnection rates ap-
proved by state commissions in arbitrations 277 and refusing to
pay symmetrical reciprocal compensation rates.278 The contin-
uing discriminatory LEC treatment of CMRS providers since the
passage of the 1996 Act warrants FCC exercise of its jurisdiction
to regulate both intrastate and interstate LEC-CMRS intercon-
nection.
Policy Considerations Favoring Federal Regulation of
LEC-CMRS Interconnection Agreements
Consideration of the various policies underlying the 1934 Act,
the Budget Act, and the 1996 Act provides additional support for
the assertion of federal jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS intercon-
nection. These statutes encompass three policies that the FCC
would further by exercising its section 332 authority.
First, Congress has emphasized repeatedly the importance of
interconnection of telecommunications carriers to achieve "a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
274. See General Order, 1997 WL 191023, at *34 (La. P.S.C. Apr. 1, 1997).
275. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
276. See id.
277. See Remarks of Commissioner Rachelle Chong Before the Cellular Telecomms.
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communication service... at reasonable charges."279 Intercon-
nection between networks and carriers is a prerequisite for na-
tionwide communication." ° Congress recognized this necessity
in the 1934 Act by authorizing the FCC to require common car-
riers "to establish physical connections with other carriers."2 81
Congress reaffirmed the importance of interconnection when it
amended section 332(c) of the 1934 Act by enacting the Budget
Act in 1993.12 The House Budget Committee report accompa-
nying the bill stated: "The Committee considers the right to
interconnect an important one which the Commission shall seek
to promote, since interconnection serves to enhance competition
and advance a seamless national network."21 Interpreting this
legislation, the FCC concluded that "commercial mobile radio
service interconnection with the public switched network will be
an essential component in the successful establishment and
growth of CMRS offerings."284
Moreover, this federal policy of promoting interconnection is
interwoven with the requirement that common carriers provide
service at "just and reasonable" rates. 2' The FCC recently
stated:
The availability of interconnection cannot, however, be di-
vorced from its price. Interconnection that is priced too high
can be the marketplace equivalent of no interconnection. An
interconnection obligation is undermined if the charges im-
posed for interconnection are excessive, and society will not
enjoy the benefits [of competition and a seamless net-
work]. 288
279. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
280. See LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM, supra note 37, at 5024-25.
281. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a).
282. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(b)(2)(A)(iii), § 332(c), 107 Stat. 312, 393
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (West Supp. 1997)).
283. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 261 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
This statement suggests that Congress granted the FCC broad authority to promote
LEC-CMRS interconnection.
284. CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 4, at 1499.
285. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b); see also id. § 151 (establishing the objective of communi-
cation service "at reasonable charges").
286. LEC-CMRS Interconnection NPRM, supra note 37, at 5025.
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The regulatory regime governing interconnection thus should
further Congress's stated policy of promoting interconnection at
just and reasonable rates.
Second, Congress and the FCC have expressed a strong desire
to promote nondiscriminatory treatment of telecommunications
carriers. Section 202 of the 1934 Act expressly prohibits "unjust
or unreasonable discrimination in charges [or] practices."27
The 1996 Act enacted section 251(c), which specifically requires
incumbent LECs to provide interconnection on rates, terms, and
conditions that are nondiscriminatory.288 Similarly, the FCC
has advocated the principle of nondiscriminatory LEC-CMRS
interconnection for many years.2 9
Third, by amending section 332 via the Budget Act, Congress
espoused a policy of promoting the development of a national
wireless communications network. The House Budget
Committee's report stated that one of the purposes of section
332 is "[tlo foster the growth and development of mobile services
that, by their nature, operate without regard to state lines as an
integral part of the national telecommunications infrastruc-
ture."29 Congress thus recognized the unique interstate char-
acteristics of wireless communications 291' and expressed a
strong interest in promoting the growth of this industry.
By asserting its authority to regulate LEC-CMRS interconnec-
tion, the FCC would further each of these policies. First, because
CMRS providers commonly operate service areas that encompass
more than one state,292 if a CMRS provider needs to arbitrate
an interconnection agreement pursuant to sections 251 and 252,
then it will be subjected to multiple arbitration proceedings.293
This system is likely to place a financial burden on wireless
providers operating in multistate service areas, to subject them
287. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a).
288. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1997).
289. See, e.g., Policy Statement, supra note 29, at 10,838.
290. HR. REP. NO. 103-111, at 260 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587.
291. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,252 (separate statement of
Comm'r Chong).
292. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
293. See Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,252 n.7 (separate statement of
Comm'r Chong) (noting that a PCS provider in the Washington-Baltimore MTA could
be subjected to six state arbitration proceedings).
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to regulatory delay, and to hinder the progress of LEC-CMRS
interconnection and the growth of the wireless industry.2"
Furthermore, because Iowa Utilities Board vacated the federal
pricing regulations,295 multiple state arbitrations may subject
CMRS providers to different interconnection rates in each
state."' By exercising its section 332 jurisdiction, the FCC
could impose a federal arbitration procedure for interconnection
arbitrations involving CMRS providers operating multistate
service areas.297 Under federal arbitration, a wireless provider
could resolve interconnection agreements with LECs in its entire
service area in one proceeding before the FCC or an FCC-ap-
pointed arbitrator. Such action would reduce the CMRS
providers' costs of obtaining arbitration and thus promote LEC-
CMRS interconnection and development of the wireless commu-
nications network.
The Eighth Circuit's decision to vacate the FCC pricing rules
will also increase interconnection rates obtained by CMRS pro-
viders in arbitration proceedings in states that decline to follow
the FCC's cost methodology.298 By exercising its section 332 ju-
risdiction to reestablish its pricing rules with respect to LEC-
CMRS interconnection, however, the FCC would enable CMRS
providers to obtain interconnection rates based on forward-look-
ing costs in every state.
294. See id. at 16,252-53 (separate statement of Comm'r Chong).
295. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321 et. al., 1997 ML 403401, at *9 &
n.21 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997); see also discussion supra note 260.
296. This would occur even if the CMRS provider interconnects with the same LEC
in each state.
297. Commissioner Chong hinted at such an alternative in her separate statement
accompanying the Interconnection Order:.
I have concerns that the state-by-state arbitration process may pose un-
due burdens on, or otherwise hinder the growth of, the CMRS industry.
If it does, I would not hesitate to invoke our Section 332 jurisdiction if I
believe that the framework we impose today is having adverse impacts
on the CMRS industry.
Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,253 (separate statement of Comm'r
Chong).
298. Most states, however, may defer to the forward-looking cost methodology
adopted by the FCC even though it is no longer binding. See State Regulators Say
Appeals Court Decision Won't Hurt Competition, COMM. DAILY, July 22, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 3946234.
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As discussed above, some CMRS providers have failed to ob-
tain cost-based rates in numerous negotiated interconnection
agreements. 9 This phenomenon is primarily a result of the
operation of section 252(a)(1), which permits incumbent LECs to
negotiate interconnection agreements without regard to many of
the requirements of section 251 or FCC regulations implement-
ing section 251."0 Under its section 332 authority, the FCC
may extend regulation to negotiated LEC-CMRS interconnection
agreements and require that such agreements also comply with
the cost-based pricing methodology that applies to arbitrated
interconnection agreements. Such action would ensure nondis-
criminatory treatment of wireless providers.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION: FCC ARBITRATION OF LEC-CMRS
INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS
By exercising its section 332 jurisdiction to regulate all aspects
of LEC-CMRS interconnection, the FCC could eradicate many of
the problems that CMRS providers have experienced since the
1996 Act.30 ' Asserting this authority, the FCC could promulgate
regulations requiring federal arbitration of LEC-CMRS intercon-
nection disputes.32 The FCC would require negotiation or arbitra-
tion of LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements under a system
substantially similar to that provided in sections 251 and 252,03
299. See supra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 251-78 and accompanying text.
302. Alternatively, the FCC may limit federal arbitration to disputes involving
CMRS providers operating in multistate service areas. See supra notes 292-93 and
accompanying text. The FCC alluded to the possibility of replacing the section 251
and 252 regulatory scheme with an alternative purely federal system in the Inter-
connection Order
Should the Commission determine that the regulatory scheme established
by sections 251 and 252 does not sufficiently address the problems en-
countered by CMRS providers in obtaining interconnection on terms and
conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, the Commis-
sion may revisit its determination not to invoke jurisdiction under section
332 to regulate LEC-CMRS interconnection rates.
Interconnection Order, supra note 19, at 16,006.
303. For example, the federal arbitration would follow section 252(b)'s procedural
time limitations. See 47 U.S.CA § 252(b) (West Supp. 1997); supra note 146 and ac-
companying text.
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but with the FCC or an FCC-appointed arbitrator replacing the
role of the state commission. To provide rules governing these
arbitrations, the FCC would reissue the interconnection regula-
tions, including the pricing rules that the Eighth Circuit recently
vacated in Iowa Utilities Board."'
This proposed system has the benefits of: (1) consistency with
the 1996 Act to the maximum extent possible; (2) consistency of
arbitration decisions for CMRS providers with multistate service
areas; (3) nondiscriminatory treatment of CMRS providers; and
(4) simplification of arbitration procedures for CMRS providers
with service areas that span more than one state.
First, this federal arbitration scheme is consistent with the
arbitration procedures imposed by section 252 of the 1996 Act and
with Congress's expressed preference for negotiation of intercon-
nection agreements,"5 with the important distinction that the
FCC or a FCC-appointed arbitrator would conduct any arbitration
proceedings. By adopting a scheme consistent with sections 251
and 252, the FCC would not provide CMRS providers with any
advantage over other carriers seeking to interconnect with incum-
bent LECs.
Second, federal arbitration would yield consistent arbitration
outcomes for CMRS providers operating in multistate service
areas. Under a federal arbitration system, all interconnection
disputes involving the same CMRS provider could be resolved in
one consolidated proceeding. Federal arbitration would reduce
significantly the costs of arbitration for these wireless carriers.
PCS providers would be the primary beneficiaries of this system
because many PCS service areas span more than one state."0 5
Federal arbitration thus would encourage investment in this
nascent industry."0 7
Third, a federal arbitration system would ensure that CMRS
providers receive nondiscriminatory treatment. By imposing a
requirement that negotiated interconnection agreements comply
with principles of reciprocal compensation and cost-based pricing,
304. Because section 332 would be the basis for such regulations, the regulations
would apply only to LEC-CMRS interconnection.
305. See 47 U.S.C-. § 252(a); supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 218.
307. See supra note 221.
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the FCC could prevent LECs from using their greater bargaining
power to obtain interconnection rates significantly above cost."0 8
Fourth, this proposal would reduce significantly the regulatory
burden on CMRS providers whose service areas span more than
one state."0 9 Under a federal arbitration scheme, such CMRS
providers could obtain interconnection agreements through one
arbitration proceeding before a federal arbitrator, reducing the
financial burden of multiple arbitration proceedings.
CONCLUSION
By enacting the Budget Act in 1993, Congress substantially
transformed the regulatory regime governing CMRS providers in
an effort to promote the growth of this developing sector of the
telecommunications industry. Section 332, as amended by the
Budget Act, bestowed the FCC with jurisdiction over intrastate
LEC-CMRS interconnection. Congress did not repeal section 332
when it enacted the 1996 Act; therefore, the FCC's authority with
respect to LEC-CMRS interconnection remains intact. By failing
to exercise this jurisdiction in the Interconnection Order, the
Commission missed an opportunity to provide all CMRS providers
with reciprocal, cost-based interconnection rates and to further
Congressional policies promoting interconnection, nondiscrimina-
tory treatment of carriers, and development of a national wireless
infrastructure.
Although the FCC has failed to assert its jurisdiction over LEC-
CMRS interconnection pursuant to section 332, the Commission
still has authority to act. The Eighth Circuit's recent Iowa Utili-
ties Board decision, which recognized that the Budget Act ex-
pressly modified section 2(b) of the Communications Act and
expanded the Commission's jurisdiction with respect to LEC-
CMRS interconnection, may embolden the Commission to exer-
cise this jurisdiction in the future.
Although PMRS providers have not yet concluded renegotiation
or arbitration of all pre-1996 Act nonreciprocal interconnection
agreements, a review of renegotiated agreements indicates that
308. See supra notes 256-66 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the FCC regu-
lations could provide that CMRS providers can waive this requirement.
309. See supra notes 292-97 and accompanying text.
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CMRS providers still cannot obtain interconnection at fair, cost-
based rates in many instances. The FCC, therefore, should exer-
cise its section 332 jurisdictional authority to regulate intrastate
LEC-CMRS interconnection. This Note proposes that one solu-
tion is for the FCC to take over the role of arbitrating and ap-
proving LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements. Federal arbi-
tration of LEC-CMRS interconnection disputes would further
Congress's stated goals of facilitating interconnection between
networks and promoting the growth and development of wireless
communications.
Derek Yeo
